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ABSTRACT
This study identifies “other information” in analysts’ forecasts as a legitimate proxy for
future cash flows and examines its incremental role in explaining stock return volatility.
We suggest that “other information” contains information about fundamentals beyond
that reflected in current financial statements and reflects firms’ fundamentals on a more
timely basis than dividends or earnings. Using standardized regressions, we find
volatility increases when current “other information” is more uncertain and increases
more in response to unfavorable news compared to favorable news. Variance
decomposition analysis shows that the variance contribution of “other information”
dominates that of expected-return news. The incremental role of “other information”
is at least half of the effect of earnings in explaining future volatility. The results are
more pronounced for firms with poor information environments. Overall, our results
highlight the importance of including “other information” as an additional cash-flow
proxy in future studies of stock prices and volatility.
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1 Introduction
Stock return volatility plays an essential role in understanding asset pricing, risk
management, portfolio construction, derivative valuation, and the cost of capital.1 In
theory, stock return volatility is a function of variation in cash flow news, expected
return news, or both. Empirical research has endeavored to use fundamental variables
such as dividends and accounting earnings to explain changes in volatility.2 However,
both dividends and earnings have obvious limitations as cash flow proxies. Dividends
tend to be smoothed and do not necessarily reflect future cash flows. 3 On the other
hand, accounting earnings reflect transaction-based revenue recognition and the
accompanying matching of expenses, so they are unlikely to be a timely source of
information about changes in fundamentals (Lev 1989). To the extent that accounting
earnings are conservative (Watts 2003), there is also the difficulty of explicitly
allowing for the differential timeliness with which earnings reflect good versus bad
economic news. In fact, studies have argued that return volatility is too high to be
justified by fundamental variables.4
We propose and empirically validate “other information” in analysts’ forecasts as a
novel proxy for future cash flows. “Other information” refers to information contained
in analysts’ earnings forecasts about a firm’s fundamentals beyond that reflected in
current financial statements. After controlling for earnings, we confirm the incremental
role of other information and find that it has significant and incremental explanatory
power for future stock return volatility.
We use analysts’ consensus forecasts of next-year’s earnings to construct other
information, consistent with our application of Ohlson’s (1995) linear information

1

Reasons why firm-level volatility is important include the following: the relation between perceived
riskiness and cost of capital (Froot et al. 1992), the fact that high volatility can make stock-price-based
compensation less effective and more costly (Baiman and Verrecchia 1995), the evidence that
investment strategies based on volatility can earn significant abnormal returns (e.g., Ang et al. 2006),
and, finally, the fact that arbitrageurs trading to exploit the mispricing of an individual stock face risks
related to volatility in the sense that larger pricing error may be associated with higher volatility
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
2
See, for example, Campbell (1991), Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), Irvine and Pontiff (2009),
Sadka (2007), Vuolteenaho (2002), and Wei and Zhang (2006).
3
See Lintner (1956), Chen and Zhao (2009), and Chen et al. (2013).
4
Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) find that dividend news explains only
15%-20% of the variation in market returns. In addition, several studies argue that volatility is likely to
reflect market irrationality, trading on the part of retail (noise) traders, or both (Shiller 1981, Black
1986, Brandt et al. 2010, Foucault et al. 2011).
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dynamics

5

It is well documented that analysts’ earnings forecasts capture

forward-looking information about fundamentals from sources other than financial
statements (see Cheng 2005a, Kothari 2001). However, we do not assume that the
resulting other information variable represents all public and private information.
Rather, we simply assume that earnings forecasts incorporate timely and unique
information that is not readily available from financial statements. We also recognize
that earnings forecasts may not incorporate all available information from financial
statements, as prior studies suggest that analysts fail to fully account for the information
contained in accounting earnings or earnings components. 6 Accordingly, we view
other information as an additional cash-flow proxy and consider the relative importance
of accounting earnings and other information in influencing stock return volatility as an
empirical question.

The theoretical link between other information and stock return volatility can be
understood through an extension of the accounting version of the Campbell-Shiller
model (Campbell and Shiller 1988a, Vuolteenaho 2002, Wei and Zhang 2006).7 We
incorporate Ohlson’s linear information dynamics into the model and assume that the
linear information dynamics error terms follow a conditional heteroskedastic process.
We find that the conditional variance of other information is part of the conditional
variance of stock returns. We therefore derive two testable predictions between other
information and stock return volatility.8

Our first hypothesis is rather intuitive. Given the assumption of market efficiency, if
5

See Ohlson (2001) and Hand (2001). Ohlson (2001) suggests that “analysts’ consensus forecasts of
next-year earnings would seem to be a reasonable measure of expected earnings.” Dechow et al. (1999)
use analysts’ earnings forecasts to measure the other information variables and report evidence that
supports the economic modeling of residual income as an autoregressive process.
6
See Ramnath et al. (2008) for a review. Typically, the literature indicates that financial analysts do
not fully adjust forecasts for earnings reversals, the earnings surprise in prior earnings announcements,
and past abnormal accruals.
7
More generally, the theoretical link between other information and stock return volatility can be
derived from discounted cash flow models and is not limited to the Campbell-Shiller (1988a) loglinear
version. However, without loss of generality, the accounting version of the Campbell-Shiller (1988a)
model enables us to derive a straightforward, closed form solution that is empirically testable. A related
approach is used by Wei and Zhang (2006) and Irvine and Pontiff (2009), although with a different
purpose.
8
Callen (2009) follows Ohlson (1995) and assumes that the error terms of Ohlson’s linear information
dynamics are mean-zero independent error terms with inter-temporally homoskedastic variance and
suggests a link between the unconditional variance of stock returns and the unconditional variance of
other information. However, this link is difficult to test empirically, because the unconditional variance
of other information is assumed to be constant over time.
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current other information is more uncertain, thereby increasing uncertainty about firms’
future cash flows, then future stock returns are expected to be more volatile. Our second
hypothesis predicts that volatility increases more in response to unfavorable other
information news than to favorable news. Other information news (i.e., the signed level
of other information) can be thought of as an aggregate indicator of value-relevant
events that have yet to have an impact on the financial statements. Previous studies
provide consistent evidence that stock return volatility increases after the release of
firm-specific news (Clayton et al. 2005) and also that volatility increases more in
response to unfavorable news (Engle and Ng 1993, Rogers et al. 2009). This result can
be understood in the context of either rational regime-switching models (Veronesi 1999)
or behavioral finance theories (Barberis et al. 1998, Daniel et al. 1998).

We employ two widely used approaches to examine the incremental role of other
information: standardized regression analysis and variance decomposition analysis. We
recognize the advantages and limitations of both approaches and believe that the
implementation of both methods provides robust conclusions and informative
comparisons to the existing literature.9 We measure other information in two ways.
The first approach follows Bryan and Tiras (2007), who measure other information as
the residual from regressing one-year-ahead analysts’ forecasts of future earnings on
current publicly available financial information (Ohlson and Shroff 1992, Manry et al.
2003). The second approach follows Dechow et al. (1999) and measures other
information as analysts’ consensus forecasts minus earnings forecasts predicted from
past financial accounting information.

A summary of our findings is as follows. Using standardized regressions, we find an
economically significant relationship between other information and future volatility.
Volatility increases when current other information is more uncertain and increases
more in response to unfavorable other information news. A one standard deviation
change in unfavorable other information news results in a more than 14% change in
future volatility, significantly higher than the effect of favorable news (3%), while a
one standard deviation increase in the uncertainty of other information is associated
with a 17% increase in future volatility. The results are robust to controlling for other

9

Detailed discussion can be found in section 2.4.
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volatility covariates and the existing cash-flow proxy (ROE and ROE volatility),
technology bubbles, loss reporting, corporate governance attributes, financial reporting
quality, and the inclusion of lagged stock return volatility.10 We find the effect of other
information on volatility is slightly lower than that for earnings.

The results using a variance decomposition approach also confirm that other
information is a legitimate cash-flow proxy and plays an incremental role in
determining stock return volatility. Other information news explains around 70% of the
total unexpected return variance, around eight times as large as the variance of
expected-return news (9%). The variance of negative other information news is
significantly higher than the variance of positive news. When comparing the relative
importance of other information and earnings, we find that both dominate
expected-return news and that the incremental variance of other information news is
about half of the variance of earnings news in explaining stock return variations. As
variance contribution is a function of persistence and variability, the lower variance
contribution of other information relative to accounting earnings is due to the fact that
other information is less persistent and has lower variability.

In addition, we find the relationship between other information and volatility holds for
both systematic and idiosyncratic volatility.

11

This result suggests that other

information has substantial undiversified variation and contains both firm-specific and
market-level information. This is consistent with recent studies examining the
predictive content of aggregate earnings (Ball et al. 2009), earnings announcements
(Cready and Gurun 2010), accrual and cash flow components of earnings (Hirshleifer et
al. 2009), and earnings dispersion (Jorgensen et al. 2012).

Finally, we document that the relationship between other information and future
volatility is more pronounced for firms with a relatively poor information environment.
We use earnings quality, forecast dispersion, and forecast bias as proxies for differences
10

See Chan et al. (2001) and Schwert (2002) for technology bubbles, Givoly and Hayn (2000) for loss
reporting, Ferreira and Laux (2007) for corporate governance effects, and Rajgopal and Venkatachalam
(2011) for financial reporting quality. Our results are also robust to several different measures of stock
return volatility, different sample periods, different industry categories, and different econometric
estimations such as Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions and fixed effect regressions. See section 4.3 for
additional discussion.
11
Total volatility is decomposed into systematic and idiosyncratic components by using the CAPM
and the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French 1993, 1996), respectively.
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in firms’ information environments. Our results imply that financial analysts place
greater weight on other information, and lower weight on reported accounting
information, when following firms with a poor information environment. This is also
consistent with Bryan and Tiras (2007), who suggest that Ohlson’s (1995) valuation
model better describes market pricing in poor information environments.

Our study makes several contributions. First, we are among the first to propose and
validate other information as a novel and legitimate proxy for future cash flows. We
show that the incremental role of other information is at least half of the role of
accounting earnings in explaining both market-wide and firm-specific volatility.
Although Chen et al. (2013) use analysts’ forecast revisions for cash flow estimation,
our approach differs from Chen et al.’s (2013) in important ways. Because we use
earnings forecasts rather than forecast revisions to compute cash-flow news, our
approach can be directly applied to the variance decomposition framework and
compared with prior studies. Chen et al., however, require a different definition of news
that is not directly comparable to the results obtained from other methods. Further, our
approach is relatively easy to implement. In contrast, Chen et al. require computation of
the implied cost of capital from analysts’ forecasts and then define cash-flow news as
the price change calculated from a pricing function by assuming constant implied cost
of capital. Our approach may also generate more reliable cash-flow news estimates, as
their approach likely amplifies the measurement error in cash-flow proxies attributable
to the intermediate step of implied cost of capital estimation.

Second, by introducing other information, we extend the variance decomposition
methodology of Campbell (1991), Vuolteenaho (2002), and Callen and Segal (2004) to
evaluate and compare the variance contribution of accounting earnings and other
information. We also contribute to broader capital market research by addressing the
question of what drives stock return volatility cross-sectionally. While a limited amount
of evidence relates volatility with financial disclosure (Bushee and Noe 2000), firm age
(Pástor and Veronesi 2003), accounting earnings (Wei and Zhang 2006), governance
mechanisms (Ferreira and Laux 2007), and financial reporting quality (Rajgopal and
Venkatachalam 2011), we identify other information as an additional fundamental
determinant of volatility. Taken together, our results highlight the importance of other
information and suggest that future studies that attempt to explain stock prices or
6

volatility should consider other information as a cash-flow proxy.

Our paper also adds to the literature on accounting-based valuation models. Our results
indicate that unfavorable other information is more important in explaining volatility
and that the relationship between other information and volatility is more apparent for
firms with a poor information environment. While several studies find that Ohlson’s
model is of limited empirical validity (Bar-Yosef et al. 1996, Myers 1999), our evidence
on volatility indicates that Ohlson’s valuation model is more descriptive for firms with
unfavorable other information and poor information environments.

Finally, our results have important implications for corporate disclosure policy. The
disclosure of other information is often discretionary and released strategically. Our
evidence of a positive relationship between the uncertainty of other information and
future volatility suggests that improved disclosure of other information helps to reduce
uncertainty about firms’ fundamentals and thus firm-specific risk.12 However, more
frequent disclosure of value relevant information may not be advantageous for firms
with poor information environments, as both good and bad other information is
associated with increased volatility. Evidence of an asymmetric effect of other
information news on future volatility also supports the view that managers have
incentives to delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news (Kothari et al. 2009),
as the release of bad news tends to increase a firm’s expected risk much more than the
release of good news.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our model
incorporating other information and hypotheses. Section 3 discusses sample
construction, the measurement of other information variables, and descriptive statistics.
Section 4 and Section 5 present the results of standardized regressions and the variance
decomposition approach respectively. Section 6 examines how firms’ information
environment affects the relationship between other information and volatility. Section 7
concludes.

12

For example, an increase in the frequency and precision of disclosure might increase the number of
observations drawn from the firm’s underlying earnings series and thus lower investors’ uncertainty
about the parameters of the distribution of future earnings.
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2 Motivation
2.1 The model
At the fundamental level, stock prices are the sum of expected future payoffs adjusted
by the appropriate discount rate. Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b) use a loglinear
approximation to represent the relationship between prices, dividends, and returns.
Using a variance decomposition approach, Campbell (1991), Campbell and Ammer
(1993), and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) find that expected-return news
dominates dividend news in driving equity returns at the market level. However,
although the literature often focuses on dividends as a proxy for future cash flows,
dividends are subject to the discretion of managers and do not necessarily reflect
changes in fundamentals.

To mitigate this problem, Vuolteenaho (2002) extends the Campbell-Shiller model
using the accounting clean surplus relationship (Ohlson 1995), replacing dividends
with accounting earnings. The result is a new link between unexpected stock returns
and changes in future discount rates and expected future ROEs as follows:




j 0

j 0

rit - Et-1rit  ΔEt   j (ROEi,t j  f t  j )  Et   j ri,t j   it

(1)

where rit is the return on stock i in period (t-1, t); ROEi,t+j is the return on equity in
period (t+j-1, t+j); ft+j is the risk-free rate for period (t+j-1, t+j); ρ is a constant slightly
less than one; and κit is an approximation error. In equation (1), Et-1 is the expectation
conditional on the information available at t-1, and ∆Et=Et - Et-1 is the change in
expectation from t-1 to t.

The variance of unexpected stock returns can be decomposed into three components as
follows,
Var (rit  Et 1rit )  Var ( N r.i ,t )  Var( N cf,i,t )  2 cov( N r.i ,t , N cf,i,t )

(2)



where Ncf,i,t (cash-flow news) represents Et   j (ROEi,t  j  f t  j ) , and Nr,i,t
j 0



(expected-return new) represents Et   j ri,t  j   t . Vuolteenaho (2002) finds the
j 0

cash-flow news is dominant in the right hand side of equation (2) at the firm level, and
the variance of cash-flow news is more than twice that of expected-return news.
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Following Wei and Zhang (2006), we take a first approximation of the
unexpected-return variance and focus our attention on the conditional variance of the
cash flow news. The relationship can be derived from equation (2) as:



Vart 1 (rit )  Vart 1 Et   j ROEi,t  j    i ,t 1
j 0



(3)

where i,t-1 encompasses the conditional variances of the expected-return news and the
conditional covariance between the cash flow news and expected-return news.

The key fundamental variable in our study is other information. Other information is
expected to be a timelier source of information about changes in fundamentals,
compared to either dividends or accounting earnings, the latter having been argued to
be a backward-looking measure (Ball and Shivakumar 2008). Following Vuolteenaho
(2002), we use an equivalent to Ohlson’s ROE-based linear information dynamics
based on abnormal earnings. The economic intuition behind Ohlson’s linear
information dynamics is that competition will erode above-normal returns, while firms
experiencing below-normal rates of return will either recover or eventually exit.
Providing that the normal level of ROE is equal to r, a typical firm’s ROE satisfies the
following autoregressive process with conditional heteroskedastic error terms:

ROEt  r  w( ROEt 1  r )  vt 1  ut ,

(4a)

Vart 1 (ut )  g (ut21 , ut22 ,..., ut2k , ut 1 ) ,

(4b)

vt  vt 1   t ,

(4c)

Vart 1 ( t )  f ( t21 ,  t22 ,...,  t2k ,  t 1 ) ,

(4d)

where vt is other information, namely information about future earnings not in current
earnings; w and φ are fixed persistence parameters that are nonnegative and less than
one; and ut and εt are error terms independent of each other and are assumed to follow a
conditional heteroskedastic process (Wei and Zhang 2006).13

13

We follow Callen (2009) and assume that ut and εt are independent of each other to simplify the
exposition. Relaxing this independence assumption would result in an additional covariance term in
equation (6) and equation (7). However, the focus of our study is on the (incremental) role of other
information in explaining future volatility. Furthermore, the assumption that the error terms follow a
conditional heteroskedastic process ensures that the predicted link between the conditional variance of
stock returns and the conditional variance of other information is empirically testable. In other words,
based on this assumption, the predicted link suggests that the conditional variance of stock returns is a
function of time-varying other information.
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After some simple algebra, we have

ROEt  c  wROEt 1  vt 1  ut ,

(5a)

Vart 1 (ut )  g (ut21 , ut22 ,..., ut2k , ut 1 ) ,

(5b)

vt  vt 1   t ,

(5c)

Vart 1 ( t )  f ( t21 ,  t22 ,...,  t2k ,  t 1 ) ,

(5d)

where c (= r(1 - w)) is the intercept.14

If ROEs follow process (5), it is easy to derive the following (see Appendix A for
details):


Vart 1 ( Et   j ROEt  j ) 
j 0

1
(1  w )

Vart -1 ( ut ) 
2

2
(1   )2 (1  w) 2

Vart -1 (  t ) (6)

and thus
Vart 1 ( rt ) 

1
(1  w )

2

g (ut21 , ut22 ,..., ut2k , ut 1 ) 

2
(1   ) (1  w)
2

2

f ( t21 ,  t22 ,...,  t2k ,  t 1 )   t 1

(7)
The above model suggests that the conditional variance of other information contained
in analysts’ forecasts (Vart-1(εt)) is part of the conditional variance of stock returns. In
the empirical analysis below, we adopt a nonparametric approach in constructing
proxies for the conditional variance of other information without modeling the
stochastic process for other information. In particular, following Wei and Zhang (2006),
we use two variables available at time t-1, realized volatility of other information (ε2t-1)
and realized other information itself (εt-1), as inputs to the nonparametric estimators.
The use of these two nonparametric estimators to construct the conditional variance of
other information is also supported by prior studies. For example, Adut et al. (2009)
provide evidence that the variance of analysts’ earnings forecasts is smaller when the
expected or actual news about earnings is relatively better.

2.2 Variance decomposition method
The relationship between other information and stock return volatility can also be
described in a variance decomposition framework. As discussed above, the unexpected
stock return is determined by cash flow news and expected-return new as:
14

The ROE-based information dynamic can also be directly derived from Ohlson’s (1995) linear
information dynamics using the assumption that the growth rate of book value is constant over time.
Easton (1998) and Callen (2009) also utilize similar information dynamics.
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rit - Et-1rit  N cf ,i ,t  N r ,i ,t

(8)

Accordingly, the variance of unexpected stock returns can be decomposed into the
variance of cash-flow news, the variance of expected-return news and the covariance as
in equation (2). If we use other information, v, as the key proxy for future cash flow, we
will replace Ncf in equation (2) by other information news, Nv:
Var ( rit  Et 1rit )  Var ( N r.i ,t )  Var( N v,i,t )  2 cov( N r.i ,t , N v,i,t )

(9)

As both accounting earnings and other information can be considered as future
cash-flow proxies, it is unclear which of these contributes more to changes in stock
return volatility. To examine the relative importance of earnings news and other
information news, we follow the spirit of Ohlson’s linear information dynamics and
assume that the inclusion of other information provides a better measure of future cash
flows. In such respect, the unexpected stock return is now determined by three
components: accounting earnings news (Nroe), other information news (Nv), and
expected-return news (Nr) as below:
rit - Et-1rit  N roe,i ,t  N v ,i ,t  N r ,i ,t

(10)

Taking the variances of both sides of equation (10) yields:
Var ( rit  Et 1rit )  Var ( N roe.i ,t )  Var( N v,i,t )  Var( N r,i,t )
 2 cov( N r.i ,t , N roe,i,t )  2 cov( N r.i ,t , N v,i,t )  2 cov( N roe.i ,t , N v,i,t )

(11)

Equation (9) and (11) are used to motivate our variance decomposition analysis.
Equation (9) assesses the relative importance of other information news and
expected-return news in explaining stock returns. Equation (11) further assesses the
relative importance of other information news, accounting earnings news, and
expected-return news. The greater the variance of any factor on the right side, the more
power that factor has in explaining unexpected stock returns. The relative variance
contribution is therefore defined as the contribution of each factor to the variance of
stock returns.

To implement the return variance decomposition, we follow Vuolteenaho (2002) to
estimate the one-period expected return, cash flow news, and discount rate news series
11

using a loglinear vector autoregressive (VAR) model as below:
Zt = AZt-1 + ηt

(12)

where Zt is a vector of (mean-adjusted) log stock returns, log other information
variables, log accounting earnings, and log book-to-market ratio at time t. A is the VAR
coefficient matrix. The error terms, ηt, are vectors of shocks and assumed to have a
variance-covariance matrix Ω and be independent of everything known at t-1.

With the VAR model expressed in this form, the three unexpected stock return
components, accounting earnings news (NROE), other information news (Nv), and
expected-return news (Nr), can be calculated as:
Nr,t = e1’ ρA (I - ρA)-1 ηt = λ1ηt
Nv,t = e2’ (I - ρA)-1 ηt = λ2ηt
Nroe,t = (e1’ - e2’) (I - ρA)-1 ηt = λ3ηt
where ’ denotes the transpose operator, ek’ = [0, …, 1,…, 0] is a vector with one as the
kth element and zero otherwise.

The variance and covariance of the variance decomposition as expressed in equation
(11) can be computed as:
var(Nr,t) = λ1’ Ω λ1
var(Nv,t) = λ2’ Ω λ2
var(Nroe,t) = λ3’ Ω λ3
cov(Nr,t, Nv,t) = λ1’ Ω λ2
cov(Nr,t, Nroe,t) = λ1’ Ω λ3
cov(Nv,t, Nroe,t) = λ2’ Ω λ3

2.3 Hypothesis development
Equation (7) suggests a positive relationship between realized volatility of other
information (ε2t-1) and future stock return volatility. The intuition is as follows. Given
the assumption that stock prices fully reflect the implications of current earnings for
future earnings, increased uncertainty in current other information is expected to reflect
increased uncertainty about future cash flows, and so on average future stock returns
will be more volatile.15 Hence the uncertainty of other information reflected in analysts’
15

A large part of the accounting literature suggests that the market is naive in recognizing the
time-series properties of earnings, resulting in significant post-earnings-announcement abnormal
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forecasts will be associated with fluctuations in future stock returns. Therefore our first
hypothesis is stated as follows:
H1: The future volatility of a firm’s stock returns increases if current other information
is more uncertain.

The relationship between realized other information (εt-1) and future stock return
volatility is also of particular interest, as realized other information can be thought of as
the aggregate news of all value-relevant events that have yet to have an impact on the
financial statements. Volatility can be linked to the quantity and quality of information
pertaining to firm’s fundamentals. According to this view, the most important process
affecting volatility is the news arrival process (Andersen 1996). Numerous studies have
examined price reactions to news releases, typically concluding that firm-specific news
increases stock return volatility after the release of information (Clayton et al. 2005).
Since volatility tends to be clustered (Schwert 1989), the effect of news releases tends
to continue for some time. This implies that stock return volatility is smallest when
there is no news (i.e., the level of other information is equal to zero).16

On the other hand, extensive research has found that stock return volatility increases
more in response to bad news than in response to good news (i.e., volatility asymmetry).
The ARCH-related literature provides a rich set of studies on this issue (Engle and Ng
1993). Beyond research using a time-series setting, previous cross-sectional studies,
such as Rogers et al. (2009), also find that the effect of management earnings forecasts
on short-term volatility is mainly attributable to forecasts that convey bad news.

Two strands of literature attempt to provide a theoretical framework to better explain
the asymmetrical response of stock return volatility to news. The first, based on
research in behavioral psychology, suggests that investors inappropriately extrapolate
past performance. Therefore bad news has a particularly telling impact after a long
returns (Kothari 2001). However, recent studies refine our understanding of the drift. For example,
Brown and Han (2000) suggest the market is not entirely naive but rather underestimates the
parameters of the true process.
16
Damodaran (1985) suggests that investors react to news in different ways depending on how they
think the information affects the future payoff of their assets and how big a surprise the information
was for them. Given that the level of other information is an aggregate indicator of all other
information news, the relation between other information news and volatility is ambiguous.
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period of good news because it has the effect of correcting overoptimistic projections
(Barberis et al. 1998, Daniel et al. 1998).17 The second strand of literature relates to
regime-switching rational equilibrium models. Veronesi (1999) suggests that the
asymmetric response occurs because news affects not only expected cash flows but also
the risk associated with the probability of a regime shift.18

Overall, we expect that the response of future stock return volatility to unfavorable
other information news to be stronger than for favorable news. Our second hypothesis
is stated as follows:

H2: Future stock return volatility increases more in response to unfavorable other
information than for favorable other information.
We also separately consider whether other information contained in analysts’ forecasts
(mainly) drives cross-sectional differences in systematic or idiosyncratic volatility. It
would not be surprising for hypotheses one and two to hold for idiosyncratic volatility,
because the finance literature shows that idiosyncratic volatility accounts for most of
total stock return volatility (Campbell et al. 2001, Wei and Zhang 2006). While our
theoretical model does not offer any guidance on systematic volatility or discount rate
news, we expect similar results for systematic volatility. Ball et al. (2009) find that
accounting earnings have substantial systematic components and undiversified
variation and that systematic earnings risk is correlated with market-wide return risk.
The above notion has been supported by follow-up research on market reaction to
earnings announcements (Cready and Gurun 2010), accrual and cash flow components
of accounting earnings (Hirshleifer et al. 2009), and earnings dispersion (Jorgensen et
al. 2012). Similar to accounting earnings as a proxy for future cash flow, other
17

For example, to reconcile the empirical findings of overreaction and underreaction, Daniel et al.
(1998) use psychological concepts of overconfidence and self-attribution to construct a model of
investor sentiment in the sense that “stock prices overreact to private information signals and
underreact to public signals” (p. 1,841). Barberis et al. (1998) model investors as typically (but not
always) believing that earnings are more stable than they really are. In such a situation, bad news
following a series of good news events generates a large negative response because it is a surprise,
whereas good news generates little response because it is anticipated.
18
Veronesi (1999) suggests that, in good times, bad news decreases future expected cash flow and
increases investors’ uncertainty about a regime shift in the underlying cash flow process. Risk-averse
investors thus require a higher discount rate for bearing the increasing risk of a regime shift, and this
reinforces the effect of the bad news in good times. However, as there is no similar reinforcement in the
case of good news, volatility increases more in response to bad news.
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information would be expected to be associated with systematic volatility if it has
significant undiversified variation and contains both firm-specific and market-level
information. Our third hypothesis is therefore stated as follows:
H3: Both future systematic volatility and idiosyncratic volatility of a firm’s stock
returns will increase if current other information is more uncertain or more
unfavorable.

2.4 Standardized regression vs. variance decomposition approach
We use two distinct empirical approaches to examine the incremental role of other
information in determining stock return volatility: standardized regression analysis and
variance decomposition analysis. Each method has advantages and limitations.
However, employing both enables us to draw relatively robust conclusions and provide
informative comparisons with prior literature.
First, we use regression analysis consistent with many prior volatility studies.19 The
use of regression analysis is consistent with the theoretical predictions and hypotheses
derived from equation (7). It also enables us to control for a large set of volatility
covariates to mitigate spurious correlations. However, statistical inferences and
interpretation based on the magnitude of regression coefficients are difficult, because
the magnitude of an ordinary regression coefficient depends on the scale of both the
dependent variable and the independent variables. To identify and interpret the
economic significance of other information variables in determining volatility, we use
standardized regressions (Bennett et al. 2003, Ferreira and Matos 2008). In particular,
we standardize both the independent and dependent variables, such that all variables
have the same mean (zero) and standard deviation (one), so that all estimated
coefficients based on standardized regressions are presented in comparable units. The
interpretation of such standardized regression coefficients is the expected standard
deviation change in the dependent variable given a one standard deviation change in the
independent variable.

We also adopt a variance decomposition approach in line with volatility studies such as
19

See, for example, Pástor and Veronesi (2003), Wei and Zhang (2006), Ferreira and Laux (2007),
Irvine and Pontiff (2009), Brandt et al. (2010), and Rajgopal and Venkatchalam (2011).
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Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b), Vuolteenaho (2002), and Callen and Segal
(2004). The variance decomposition analysis provides a variance-based approach to
measure value relevance of other information. It offers an intuitive representation of
the (relative) importance of other information, accounting earnings, and
expected-return news. Moreover, it explicitly controls for changes in expected returns
over time. This is important for assessing the value relevance of other information,
because small changes in expected discount rates can have a large impact on stock
returns, especially when expected returns are persistent (Campbell et al. 1997).

However, variance decomposition requires a system of VAR equations, which cannot
include a large set of volatility covariates simultaneously due to estimation complexity.
More importantly, several studies have identified empirical limitations associated with
this approach (Ball et al. 2009, Chen and Zhao 2009). For example, the expected-return
news in the variance decomposition approach cannot be accurately measured due to
low predictive power, and the cash flow news, when treated as the residual, inherits the
large misspecification error of the expected-return news. A missing state variable in the
variance decomposition approach is likely to alter the empirical conclusion. In contrast,
such model misspecification is much less damaging for regression analysis. Even if a
factor is missing in a regression model, we can still draw statistical inferences about the
specified factors despite increased noise, if the omitted variable is not highly correlated
with the specified factors.

3 Data, variable measurement and descriptive statistics
3.1 Sample
The empirical analysis employs annual accounting data, daily stock return data, and
analysts’ forecasts data from the merged Compustat XPF, I/B/E/S, and CRSP database
for the period of 1981-2011. Following prior literature, for a firm-year to be included in
the sample, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) nonmissing and positive
book value of equity at time t-1 and t-2, where t denotes time in years; (2) nonmissing
one lag of net income; and (3) a valid figure for market value of equity available for t-1
and t-2. In addition, we exclude firms with t-1 market equity less than $10 million and a
book-to-market ratio more than 100 or less than 0.01 to screen out possible data errors
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and mismatches.20 To mitigate the undue influence of outliers, we winsorize the top
and bottom one percentile of key variables used in the regression analysis.21 Consensus
analyst forecast data are extracted from the I/B/E/S unadjusted summary file. To ensure
that forecasts are current and released after the firm has filed its annual report with the
SEC and hence that earnings, book values, and other accounting information are
publicly available, one-year ahead earnings forecasts are extracted as of the fifth month
after the fiscal year-end.22 We require that there be at least three earnings forecasts
available. The interaction of CRSP, Compustat, and I/B/E/S databases produces a final
sample of 42,700 firm-year observations after applying all the above requirements.
Appendix B summarizes the measurement of all variables.

Consistent with Vuolteenaho (2002), the annual stock returns (RETURN) are
compounded from CRSP monthly returns, recorded from the beginning of the sixth
month after the fiscal year-end.23 We require a valid stock return during the last
month of the fiscal year to ensure that the return predictability is not spuriously
induced by stale prices. If the firm was delisted we use the delisted return when
available in CRSP. If the delisting return is missing, we investigate the reason. If the
delisting is performance based, we assume a -30% delisting return. Otherwise, we
assume a zero delisting return.

Stock return volatility is computed as the sample variance of daily stock returns (in
percentage) over the same recording period as stock returns. 24 The systematic and
idiosyncratic volatilities are computed as follows. First, a factor model is used to
decompose the daily stock returns into systematic and idiosyncratic return components.
The factor model used is either the CAPM or the Fama-French three-factor model.
Daily individual stock returns are applied to the models to obtain the daily systematic
and idiosyncratic return components.

20

The results remain similar if we do not impose any requirement for market equity.
Our results remain quantitatively similar if we trim the top and bottom percentiles of key variables
or keep them in the analysis.
22
The Compustat data reveal that more than 95% firms release their annual reports within three
months after the financial year. Our results are similar if we use earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S in the
fourth month after the fiscal year.
23
The results are quantitatively similar if we calculate returns from the fourth or fifth month after the
fiscal year-end.
24
Inferences are unchanged when the definition of volatility adopted by French et al. (1987) is used.
21
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In analyzing the relationship between the uncertainty of other information and stock
return volatility, we use several control variables that have been previously identified,
including return on equity (ROE), the variance of return on equity (VROE), firm size
(SIZE), firm age since listing (AGE), financial leverage (LEV), book-to-market ratio
(BM), contemporaneous stock return (RETURN), analyst forecast bias (BIAS), and
forecast dispersion (DISP).

ROE is measured as net income (NI) divided by lagged book value of equity (CEQ).
When the value of ROE is less than -100%, it is treated as a missing value because the
log transformations for the VAR model are not possible for any variable less than 0.
VROE is the sample variance of yearly ROE observations over the past five years for a
minimum of three observations. Age is measured as the logarithm of the number of
months from the firm’s IPO date. If IPO dates are unavailable, we use the first tracking
date of the firm appearing in the CRSP. SIZE is the logarithm of the firm’s market value
of equity, where market value of equity is defined as common shares outstanding
(CSHO) multiplied by the stock price (PRCC_F). LEV is equal to the sum of total
long-term debt (DLTT) and debt in current liabilities (DLC), divided by total assets
(AT). Book-to-market ratio (BM) is book value of equity (CEQ) divided by the market
value of equity. In line with prior literature, firms with lower ROE and higher VROE
are expected to experience higher stock return fluctuations (Pástor and Veronesi 2003,
Wei and Zhang 2006). We expect that younger and smaller firms will experience higher
stock return volatility and a negative relationship between BM and volatility because
firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to experience greater
fluctuation in stock returns (Bushee and Noe 2000, Ferreira and Laux 2007).
We also control for attributes of analysts’ forecasts to ensure that any link between the
uncertainty of other information and stock return volatility is not driven by specific
properties of analysts’ forecasts, such as forecast dispersion and forecast bias. Studies
by Ajinkya and Gift (1985) and Daley et al. (1988) find that the ex ante variability of
stock returns around earnings announcements is positively related to analysts’ forecast
dispersion. Ackert and Athanassakos (1997) further show that analysts’ forecast
dispersion is positively associated with analyst optimism. We measure forecast bias
(BIAS) as the absolute difference between the one-year-ahead consensus mean analyst
forecast of year t+1 earnings per share reported in the fifth month after the fiscal
18

year-end and the actual earnings per share reported in I/B/E/S, divided by stock price at
the fiscal year-end. Forecast dispersion (DISP) is defined as the standard deviation of
one-year-ahead consensus analyst forecasts of year t+1 earnings per share, standardized
by the absolute value of consensus forecasted earnings per share.25

3.2 Measurement of other information
Our other information variable is measured using two distinct approaches. We use V1
(V2) to represent the other information variable estimated from the first (second)
approach outlined below. As discussed in section 2, we use realized volatility of other
information as a nonparametric estimator of the conditional variance of other
information, denoted as VV1 (VV2). VV1 (VV2) is defined as the sample variance of
the yearly V1 (V2) observations over the past five years (with a minimum of three
observations).

Following earlier studies, our first measure of other information is the residual from
regressing one-year-ahead analysts’ forecasts on current publicly available financial
information (Bryan and Tiras 2007, Ohlson and Shroff 1992, Manry et al. 2003).26 We
estimate the following cross-sectional regression to identify other information
contained in analysts’ forecasts that is not contained in current earnings or book value:
FROEi ,t  c0  c1BVPSi ,t  c2 ROEi ,t  vi ,t

(13)

where, for each firm i, FROEi,t is the one-year-ahead consensus mean analyst forecast
of earnings per share at year t divided by book value of equity per share at year t;
BVPSi,t is net book value of equity per share at year t; and vt is a residual that proxies for
other information.27 As the actual EPS reported in I/B/E/S is more consistent with the
analysts’ EPS forecasts, we also estimate an alternative version of equation (13) where
ROEi,t is replaced by AROEi,t (namely I/B/E/S ROE, measured by the actual earnings
per share of year t+1 reported in I/B/E/S, divided by book value of equity per share at
year t). Equation (13) is estimated separately for each fiscal year, with each regression
using all available observations from that year.28
25

The deflator is commonly used to reduce heteroskedasticity. We also standardize by the firm’s stock
price at the end of year. The main results are qualitatively similar.
26
Our results remain similar if we follow Manry et al. (2003) and exclude BVPS as a regressor in
equation (9).
27
The results are similar if we use the consensus median forecasts rather than the mean forecast of
earnings per share.
28
We also estimate a separate regression for each fiscal year, with each regression using all available
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Panel A of Table 1 reports results for the cross-sectional estimation of equation (13)
for the pooled sample from 1981 through 2010. The explanatory power of the
regression using ROE (AROE) is 34.8% (45.0%). The intercepts of both regressions
are positive and significant, consistent with a systematic positive difference between
the one-year-ahead forecasts and past actual earnings (i.e., optimistic forecasts).
Our second approach reflects Ohlson’s (2001) suggestion that the other information
variable, vt, can be interpreted as the difference between the conditional expectation of
earnings for period t+1 based on all available information and the expectation of
earnings based only on current period earnings.29 We follow Dechow et al. (1999)
and Ohlson (2001) and use consensus analyst earnings forecasts to measure the year t
conditional expectation of year t+1 earnings. The expectation of earnings based only
on current period earnings is estimated from the AR(1) process of ROE. Thus the
other information variable can be interpreted as vt = FROEt – (c + wROEt). Here
FROEt is the one-year-ahead consensus analyst forecast of earnings per share at year
t+1, divided by book value of equity per share at year t. Both c and w are parameters
of the ROE process.

We follow Fama and French (2000) and Cheng (2005b) and use conditional
cross-sectional estimation of w to capture cross-sectional variation in the earnings
persistence as a function of its economic determinants. Economic determinants
employed include market share (the ratio of firm’s sales to total industry sales), firm
size (the natural logarithm of total assets), R&D intensity (R&D expenditures over
sales), advertising intensity (advertising expenditure over sales), capital intensity (the
ratio of depreciation, depletion, and amortization to sales), the magnitude of earnings
(the absolute value of ROE), the magnitude of special items (the absolute value of the
ratio of special items to lagged book value), and the magnitude of total accruals (the
absolute value of the ratio of total accruals to lagged total assets). The measurement of
the determinants of ROE persistence is summarized in Panel D of Appendix B.

observations in the sample from previous years, going back as far as 1981. The main results hold.
29
Ohlson (1995) defines his other information variable, vt, as the difference between the conditional
expectation of abnormal earnings for period t+1 based on all available information and the expectation
of abnormal earnings based only on current period abnormal earnings.
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The conditional value of ROE persistence (w) used in calculating the other
information variable is estimated as follows. We first estimate earnings autoregressive
regressions in which each of the eight determinants of ROE persistence are included
as interactive effects:
n

ROEi ,t 1  c  b0 ROEi ,t   bk ( Fk ,t ROEi ,t )  ui ,t 1

(14)

k 1

where Fk,t is the k'th persistence determinant, k=1, 2, …,n; n is the number of variables
used in the estimation with a maximum of eight. Equation (14) is estimated separately
for each fiscal year, with each regression using all available observations from that
year.30 The conditional estimated value of ROE persistence for each firm-year is then
computed using the parameter estimates from this regression:
8

wˆ i ,t  bˆ0,t   bˆk ,t Fk ,t

(15)

k 1

If one of the variables required to calculate w is missing, then the respective term is
set equal to 0.31

The results reported in Panel B of Table 1 are the time-series average of the
cross-sectional estimates for the annual regressions. All of the eight determinants are
found be statistically significant and consistent with their hypothesized signs.
Consistent with Dechow et al. (1999) and Cheng (2005b), the coefficients associated
with ROE magnitude, special items, and total accruals are all significantly negative,
indicating that earnings persistence is lower when earnings contain more transitory
accounting items. Market share, firm size, and proxies for firm-level barriers to entry
(R&D and advertising intensity) all have positive coefficients.

[Insert Table 1 here]

3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The average
firm has a market capitalization of $758 million, a book-to-market ratio of about 0.62, a
30

Following Dechow et al. (1999), we also estimate a separate regression for each fiscal year, with
each regression using all available observations from previous years, going back as far as 1950. The
results are similar to those reported in the text.
31
A sample restricted to observations without missing values for each persistence determinant yields
qualitatively similar results.
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tracking period in Compustat of 17.5 years, and financial leverage of 22% of total assets.
For brevity, in the following we concentrate on the other information variables
estimated from ROE, but all results continue to hold when using estimates from AROE.
Results indicate that average (median) annual total volatility is 12.33% (6.14%).
Outliers and nonnormality result in a substantial difference between the mean and
median, as evidenced by skewness and kurtosis values of 6.00 and 53.21 respectively.
Patterns of positive skewness and significant leptokurtosis are also found in other
measures of stock return volatility, the volatility of other information, and ROE
volatility. Therefore, following Durnev et al. (2004), we apply a logarithmic
transformation. The values of skewness and kurtosis of the natural logarithm of total
volatility are equal to 0.34 and 3.12 respectively, indicating the natural logarithm of
these variables is more symmetric and normal. Decomposition of total volatility shows
that the total variation of stock returns mainly reflects idiosyncratic volatility, which is
about 82% of total volatility.

The mean of V1 is 0 by construction, compared to that of V2 (0.058). Recall that the
other information variable is assumed to have a mean of zero and a normal distribution.
This suggests that the second measure of other information (V2) may incorporate the
influence of forecast bias.32 The standard deviations of V1 and V2 are 0.123 and 0.118
respectively, both of which are lower than the standard deviation of ROE (0.274). The
mean of VV1 is 0.009, slightly lower than that of VV2 (0.010).

[Insert Table 2 here]

4 Results using standardized regression
4.1 Other information and total volatility
We begin with a set of standardized regressions of total volatility on other information
variables as well as the control variables discussed above:
Log(VOLi ,t )   0   1Vi ,t 1   2Vi ,t 1   3 Log(VVi ,t 1 )   4 ROE i ,t 1   5 Log(VROE i ,t 1 )   6 Ri ,t
  7 Sizei ,t 1   8 Age i ,t 1   9 Lev i ,t 1   10 Log(BM i ,t 1 )   11 BIAS i ,t 1   12 DISPi ,t 1   i ,t

(16)
where VOLi,t is the volatility measure of stock i in year t, as defined in (8). Vi,t-1 is the
measure of other information in year t-1. V+ represents favorable other information
32

We thus control for forecast bias in our regression analysis presented in section 4.
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news, equal to V if V is positive and 0 otherwise. V- represents unfavorable other
information news, equal to V if V is negative and 0 otherwise. LOG(VVi,t-1), the
volatility of other information, is defined as the natural logarithm of the sample
variance of V within the past five years. All independent variables, with the exception
of the contemporaneous return variable Ri,t, are lagged by one period to allow the
market sufficient time to incorporate financial statement information.

Table 3 presents estimated coefficients of the above regression, where total stock return
volatility is the dependent variable. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using
standard errors corrected for both clustering by firm and by year (Petersen 2009). The
results support H1, indicating that future stock return volatility is significantly
positively associated with the variability of current-period other information. The
coefficients on VV are significant and positive in all specifications. For restricted
estimates (Column (1) and (3)), the estimated coefficients are 0.213 (t = 9.69) for V1
and 0.171 (t = 8.23) for V2, indicating that a one standard deviation increase in the log
of other information variance results in a more than 17% increase in the log of stock
return volatility. When combined with all control variables (Column (2) and (4)), the
magnitude of the slope coefficient of VV decreases to 0.122 (t = 6.96) and 0.092 (t =
5.10) but remains significant.

We then compare the effect of favorable versus unfavorable other information. There is
a consistent negative association between volatility and V-. In column (1) and (3), for
example, the regression coefficient is -0.204 for V1 (t = -15.42) and -0.139 for V2 (t =
-9.09), suggesting a one standard deviation change in V- results in more than 14%
change in future stock return volatility. However, the relationship between volatility
and V+ is noticeably weaker. Although the estimated coefficient is statistically
significant for V2 but not for V1 (0.006 for V1 with a t-value of 0.48 and 0.032 for V2
with a t-value of 2.21), its magnitude in both cases implies far lower economic
significance. In fact, a one standard deviation increase in V+ results in less than a 3%
increase in volatility. We use a Wald test with a null that β1 equals -β2 and find that the
magnitude of the V- coefficient is significantly higher than that of the V+ coefficient.
The above results do not alter substantially when all control variables are included.
Thus the above results support H2, namely that stock return volatility tends to increase
more in response to bad other information news than to good news.
23

Controlling for firm characteristics such as ROE and VROE does not change our
conclusions, although the coefficients and robust t-statistics are attenuated (see
columns (2) and (4)). The results confirm that other information variables provide
incremental explanatory power of explaining future stock return volatility. In column
(2), the regression coefficient on V- is -0.105, comparable to that for ROE (-0.127). The
estimated coefficient on VV is 0.122, slightly lower than that for VROE (0.144). Most
control variables have significant coefficients. ROE impacts negatively on future
volatility, while VROE has a positive association. Small, young, and growth firms tend
to be more volatile, as indicated by the significant and consistent signs of SIZE, AGE,
and BM. The coefficients on BIAS and DISP are also consistent as hypothesized and
statistically significant.

We also examine the robustness of our results to the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation
and report the estimated coefficients in Panel B of Table 3.33 Comparing the results of
Fama-MacBeth regressions to those in Panel A, the magnitude of the coefficients on
other information variables declines slightly to -0.180 (V-) and 0.207 (VV) but still with
significant t-statistics of -15.29 and 12.48 respectively (see column (5)). We also divide
our sample period into three 10-year sub-periods, namely 1981-1990, 1991-2000, and
2001-2010 and estimate separately for the three subsamples. The results for different
time periods are essentially the same and so are not reported in detail.34

[Insert Table 3 here]

4.2 Systematic volatility versus idiosyncratic volatility
Our third hypothesis reflects the expectation that fundamental variables can cause both
systematic and idiosyncratic variation in stock returns. Although it is widely held that
most fundamental variables cause idiosyncratic volatility at the firm level, the relative
importance of other information on systematic versus idiosyncratic volatility is
ultimately an empirical issue. Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients for
33

The t-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for autocorrelation and conditional
heteroskedasticity (Newey and West 1987). The results of Fama-MacBeth regressions for other tables
(untabulated) are similar to the results based on two-way clustering estimation.
34
We also employ a fixed effect regression to address possible concerns about unobserved individual
heterogeneity, where every firm and every year in the sample is assigned a dummy variable. The results
(untabulated) are qualitatively similar to those reported above.
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idiosyncratic volatility (Panel A) and systematic volatility (Panel B), where the
Fama-French three-factor model is used for volatility decomposition.35
The results support H3, namely that a typical firm’s other information variable is
associated with differences in both the systematic and idiosyncratic components of
volatility. The coefficients on VV are significantly positive in all specifications of
either systematic or idiosyncratic volatility. For instance, when combined with all
control variables, the magnitudes of the VV1 (VV2) coefficient are 0.098 (0.075) for
systematic volatility and 0.127 (0.098) for idiosyncratic volatility, both with significant
t-statistics. As idiosyncratic volatility accounts for over 80% of total volatility, it is not
surprising that the main results are repeated for idiosyncratic volatility. However, the
adjusted R2 for systematic volatility (5.2% for V1 and 4.6% for V2) is much smaller
than for idiosyncratic volatility (10.1% for V1 and 8.0% for V2). The higher
explanatory power of other information for idiosyncratic volatility is consistent with
Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Ammer (1993) that expected-return news
dominates cash-flow news in driving aggregate stock returns and Vuolteenaho (2002)
that cash-flow news is the main factor that drives stock returns at the firm level. We also
disentangle the relationship between favorable and unfavorable other information with
future systematic and idiosyncratic volatility. All coefficients on V- are significantly
negative, while most coefficients on V+ are positive but insignificant. As a result, for
both systematic and idiosyncratic volatility, the response to “bad news” is significantly
stronger than for “good news.”

[Insert Table 4 here]

4.3 Additional tests using standardized regression
In this section, we confirm the relationship between stock return volatility and other
information variables through a battery of robustness checks. Space constraints limit
the following discussion to focusing on total volatility only, but the results for
idiosyncratic and systematic volatility are similar and are available upon request.

35

Results for systematic and idiosyncratic volatility estimated from the CAPM are qualitatively similar
and are available upon request.
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4.3.1 Controlling for analyst forecast bias
The underlying assumption in our model is that analysts’ earnings forecasts reflect the
market expectations about a firm’s future cash flows in a timely fashion. However,
there is ample evidence that analyst forecasts tend to be overly optimistic. Although
forecast bias is included as a control, forecast biases may contaminate our other
information measures, which in turn would affect our empirical conclusion.

To mitigate such concern, we conduct the regression analysis for two subsamples,
which include firm-years with high and low forecast biases in a particular year. We
also construct three alternative measures of other information. In particular, rather
than using the mean forecasts, we use the highest (most optimistic) forecasts, the
lowest (most pessimistic) forecasts, and the median forecasts to measure other
information. As such, even if there is a bias when analysts’ forecasts are used, the bias
might not be as strong if the lowest or the highest forecasts are used. Panel A and
Panel B of Table 5 report the results for firm-years with high and low forecast biases,
respectively, and Panel C and Panel D display the results for alternative other
information measures based on the highest and lowest forecasts, respectively. We find
that the coefficient on V- and VV are consistently significant with similar magnitudes
as those reported above. We therefore conclude that analyst forecast biases are
unlikely to be the main driver of our results.

4.3.2 High technology and loss firm effects
The link between other information and volatility may be attributable to high
technology firms, given the increasing number of high technology firms in recent years
(Chan et al. 2001, Schwert 2002). We re-estimate our results after separating
high-technology firms. 36 Results reported in Panel E and Panel F of Table 5 still
support our hypotheses. The magnitude of the V-, ROE, and VROE coefficients for
high-technology firms (for V1, coefficients = -0.060, -0.075, and 0.107, respectively) is
lower than those for nontechnology firms (coefficients = -0.115, -0.122, and 0.131,
respectively), indicating a less important role for fundamental variables in explaining
future volatility of technology firms.

36

Following Francis and Schipper (1999), firms in 14 three-digit SIC codes (283, 357, 360-368, 481,
737, and 873) are identified as technology-intensive industries.
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The relationship between other information and volatility may also be at least partially
attributable to the effect of losses, as Hayn (1995) shows that the market reaction to a
loss differs from the response to a profit, and Givoly and Hayn (2000) show that the
number of loss firms has increased since the 1990s. We classify firms into loss and
profit firms based on net income (NI). The results shown in Panel G and Panel H of
Table 5 generally confirm our previous findings, and we find that the role of other
information is more important in explaining volatility for profit firms.37 This might be
due to the fact that loss firms are often expected to have “bad news,” so that the
expected level of other information news for losses is negative rather than zero,
resulting in a smaller unexpected component of “bad news.”

[Insert Table 5 here]

4.3.3 Listing markets and industry effects
We separately examine results for NASDAQ-traded stocks from those traded on the
NYSE/AMEX. Schwert (2002) demonstrates that the NASDAQ portfolio became
unusually volatile relative to the S&P portfolio over 1995-2001.38 Of our full sample,
38% of all firm-years are from NASDAQ, while the rest come from NYSE/AMEX. We
repeat all of the analysis for each subsample and find the results remain similar.
Roll (1992) finds that industry factors can explain substantial variation in stock returns.
The importance of industry factors in equity returns is also evident in the so-called
momentum effect (Moskowitz and Grinblatt 1999). Firms in different industries might
also display different stock price volatility for other reasons. 39 To control for possible
industry effects, the sample is divided into subsamples using the Fama and French
five-industry classification.40 We find the results are robust across different industries.

37

For profit firms, the effect of V- becomes stronger than VV, ROE, and VROE (e.g., using V1, the
comparison is -0.142 compared to 0.111, -0.135, and 0.129, respectively). However, the impact of Vbecomes much weaker in the case of losses (e.g., -0.061 for losses compared to -0.142 for profit firms).
38
It is also well documented that different markets provide different degrees of liquidity (Christie and
Schultz 1994) and cost of executing trades (Huang and Stoll 1996), both of which may differentially
influence our volatility analyses.
39
For instance, firms that operate in finance-related industries (e.g., banks, insurance, life assurance,
and investment companies) and utility industries (e.g., water, electricity and gas distribution
companies) are highly regulated and have to comply with stringent legal requirements pertaining to
their financing.
40
The five-industry classification approach of Fama and French is available on Ken French’s website:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html.
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4.3.4 Controlling for corporate governance, earnings quality, and lagged
volatility
Ferreira and Laux (2007) report a strong negative relationship between corporate
governance policy and idiosyncratic volatility. We therefore include an index of a firm’s
antitakeover provisions, namely the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
governance index as an additional control.41 Our sample size reduces to 7,436 because
the governance index is only available for 3,787 firms over 1990-2004, but the
empirical results are qualitatively similar. Consistent with Ferreira and Laux (2007), the
index of antitakeover provisions is found to be negatively and significantly associated
with future stock return volatility (-0.028 for V1 and -0.031 for V2).

Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) document a negative relationship between
earnings quality and volatility. The rationale in Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) is
that when earnings quality is low, financial analysts place less weight on earnings
information from financial statements and instead place greater weight on private
(possibly idiosyncratic) information. Consistent with Rajgopal and Venkatachalam
(2011), we find the earnings quality metric is positively associated with future volatility
(0.046 for V1 and 0.038 for V2), with significant t-statistics of 8.47 (V1) and 8.15 (V2),
respectively. After accounting for earnings quality, we still find a robust relationship
between other information and future volatility.42

Our prior regression analyses do not include the prior level of stock return volatility (or
its components) as a control variable, consistent with most cross-sectional volatility
studies (Bushee and Noe 2000, Pástor and Veronesi 2003, Ferreira and Laux 2007,
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2011). This is because our focus is on explaining the level
of volatility rather than the change in volatility (see Bushee and Noe (2000) for more
discussion). Furthermore, even though the persistent nature of stock return volatility
could cause the residuals from a regression of the level of volatility to be serially
correlated, such residual autocorrelation can be corrected by using the Petersen (2009)
41

We thank Andrew Metrick for providing the IRRC governance index.
Earnings quality is measured based on the McNichols (2002)’s modification of the Dechow-Dichev
(2002) model. We also use two additional measures of earnings quality based on the modified Jones
approach as in Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) and the original Dechow and Dichev (2002) model.
All the results are qualitatively similar.
42
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adjusted standard errors, as we report above. However, we do examine the sensitivity of
our results to the inclusion of lagged volatility and find our main results continue to
hold.43 Take V1 as an example. When all control variables including lagged volatility
are included, the regression coefficients for V+, V-, and VV are 0.025 (t = -1.74), -0.038
(t = -3.23), and 0.035 (t = 2.84) respectively, reconfirming our previous results.

5 Results using variance decomposition
5.1 Main results
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Vuolteenaho 2002, Callen and Segal 2004), we
estimate the VAR coefficient matrix by trading off efficiency for robustness and
simplicity. The VAR is estimated using weighted least squares separately for each
Fama-French (1997) industry, with one prediction regression per state variable. Each
annual cross-section is weighted equally by deflating the data for each firm-year by
the number of firms in the affiliated industry. This approach yields the VAR
parameters at the industry level, but the news variable can be computed at the
firm-year level. We calculate robust standard errors of the variance components using
the Shao-Rao (1993) jackknife method.

We first explore the relative importance between other information news and
expected-return news. Panel A and Panel B of Table 6 report parameter estimates of the
VAR model for V1 and V2 respectively. The results suggest that expected returns are
high when past one-year returns are low and when other information and the
book-to-market ratio are high. Expected other information is high when past other
information and the book-to-market ratio are high. Not surprisingly, the expected future
book-to-market ratio is mostly affected by the past book-to-market ratio.

The variance decomposition implied by the VAR is shown in Panel C of Table 6. We
find that other information news dominates expected-return news in driving firm-level
stock returns. The variance of other information news is 13.5% for V1 and 13.2% for
V2, around eight times as large as the variance of expected-return news (1.7% for V1
and 1.6% for V2). We also compare the variance of positive and negative other
information news and find that the variance of negative other information news is
significantly higher than the variance of positive news (7.0% vs. 6.5% for V1 and 6.8%
43

We acknowledge the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer in conducting this analysis.
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vs. 6.4% for V2). Panel D of Table 6 shows that other information news explains
around 70% of the total variance of the unexpected change in returns, whereas
expected-return news explains only about 9%. The remainder is explained by the joint
negative covariance between other information news and expected-return news.
Overall, the results indicate that other information is a legitimate surrogate for future
cash flow and other information news is far more fundamental than expected-return
news in driving firm-level returns.
We also follow Vuolteenaho (2002)’s decomposition and examine the relative
importance between accounting earnings news and expected-return news. Panel E
reports the variance decomposition implied by the VAR. The variance of earnings
news is 20.5%, significantly higher than the variance of expected-return news (2.0%).

[Insert Table 6 here]

Given the importance of both other information news and earnings news, we next
examine the relative impact of other information news and earnings news on changes
in current stock returns. Parameter estimates of the VAR are presented in Table 7 for
V1 (Panel A) and for V2 (Panel B). The return equation shows that returns are
positively associated with lagged other information, earnings, and book-to-market
ratio. Both other information and earnings are persistent, but the persistence of
earnings (0.389 for V1 and 0.422 for V2) is higher than that of other information
(0.269 for V1 and 0.179 for V2). Accounting earnings are significantly and positively
associated with past returns, while the relationship between other information and past
returns is relatively weak and insignificant.

The results of the variance decomposition are presented in Panel C of Table 7. The
variance of earnings news is around twice the variance of other information, and the
difference between the two is significant. For example, for V1, the variance of other
information news and earnings news is 6.1% and 12.2% respectively. However, both
earnings and other information variances are significantly larger than the variance of
expected-return news (1.8% for V1). The three covariance terms are relatively small
in magnitude for both specifications. Similar to the above findings, we confirm that
the variance of negative other information news is significantly higher than the
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variance of positive news (3.3% vs. 2.8% for V1 and 2.6% vs. 2.4% for V2). Panel D
provides an intuitive representation of these results. The table shows that, for V1 (V2),
other information explains 33.2% (27.2%) of the total variance of the unexpected
returns, whereas accounting earnings explains 66.3% (69%). By comparison,
expected-return news explains less than 10% of the total variance.

[Insert table 7 here]

Overall, the results of variance decomposition confirm the incremental role of other
information in determining stock return volatility. We find that both other information
and accounting earnings news dominate expected-return news and the variance of other
information news is around half of the variance of earnings news in driving stock
returns. The relative importance between other information and earnings can be
understood by equation (7), which shows that the variance contribution is a function of
both persistence and variability. As shown in Table 7, accounting earnings are found
to be more persistent than other information. The persistence of V1 (V2) is 0.269
(0.179), significantly lower than earnings persistence of 0.389 (0.422). In addition,
summary statistics in Table 1 shows that the standard deviation of earnings (0.274) is
also higher than that of other information (0.123 for V1 and 0.118 for V2). The
combination of lower persistence and variability therefore results in the fact that other
information contributes less than accounting earnings to the variance of unexpected
stock returns.

5.2 Additional variance decomposition tests
We also examine whether our results are robust to alternative measures of other
information, alternative estimation procedure, or specifications of the models and
potential omitted correlated variables. Our previous analysis uses lagged book value
of equity as the denominator for measuring other information. However, there may be
outliers created by very low book values, even after we have winsorized the variables
at the top and bottom percentile and excluded firms with low market value of equity
(less than $10 million) and extreme book-to-market ratios (higher than 100 or lower
than 0.01). We therefore retest variance decomposition by using total assets as the
denominator to measure alternative measures of other information and earnings. The
results presented in Panel E1 of Table 7 are found to be qualitatively similar.
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As discussed in section 4.3, our other information measures also may be affected by
forecast biases, as it is well documented that analyst forecasts tend to be
overoptimistic. We report the results of variance decomposition (in Panel E2 and E3
of Table 7) for two alternative measures of other information by using the highest
(most optimistic) forecasts and the lowest (most pessimistic) forecasts rather than the
mean forecasts. The results are qualitatively similar.

Finally, we follow Vuolteenaho (2002) to estimate the VAR system over the entire
sample. In such respect, the VAR is estimated using weighted least squares on the
panel data, with one pooled prediction regression per state variable. Each annual
cross-section is weighted equally by deflating the data for each firm-year by the
number of firms in the cross-section of that year. We also estimate a richer VAR
model with two lags of each of the state variables. The results (not tabulated) are
quantitatively similar. To minimize the possibility that alternative explanations drive
the reported results in Table 6 and Table 7, we consider the impact of firm size,
technology firms, and loss firms. In particular, we implement these robustness checks
by forming two subsamples based on the magnitude of the control variable. Without
exception, the results obtained (not tabulated) are similar to those reported above.
6 Information environment and the relationship between other information news
and stock return volatility
In this section, we examine how a firm’s information environment influences the extent
to which uncertainty about other information news impacts firm-specific risk. Bryan
and Tiras (2007) suggest that in poor information environments (e.g., poor earnings
quality or high forecast dispersion) financial analysts are unlikely to rely on
poor-quality earnings when predicting future earnings performance. In fact, financial
analysts tend to weight “other” value-relevant information more heavily relative to the
weighting on earnings and book value in formulating their forecasts. Given that
financial analysts are likely to place greater weight on other information under such
circumstances, we would expect the effect of other information news on future stock
return volatility to be stronger when firms have a poor information environment.

As our focus is to identify how the effect of other information news and future volatility
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varies across information quality, we retest equation (16) by including a dummy (0,1)
indicator variable, H, that represents firms with poor information environment. In
particular, when the value of the information environment variable for a firm-year is
ranked in the upper or lower half of the distribution in the corresponding year, we
classify this observation as having either a “good” or “poor” information environment
respectively.44 Following prior studies (Bryan and Tiras 2007, Ferreira and Laux 2007,
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2011), we use three proxies for information environment:
earnings quality, forecast dispersion, and forecast bias, each as defined above. We
include the interaction term of H and other information news to examine the effect of
other information news across good and poor information environments. The
regression model is as follows:
Log(VOLi ,t )   0   1Vi ,t 1   2Vi ,t 1  H i ,t 1   3Vi ,t 1   4Vi ,t 1  H i ,t 1   5 Log(VVi ,t 1 )
  6 ROE i ,t 1   7 Log(VROE i ,t 1 )   8 Ri ,t   9 Sizei ,t 1   10 Age i ,t 1   11 Lev i ,t 1
  12 Log(BM i ,t 1 )   13 BIAS i ,t 1   14 DISPi ,t 1   i ,t

(17)
The results in Table 8 suggest that the relationship between other information news and
future return volatility varies across good and bad information environments. Take the
results in column (1) as an example. For firms classified as having a good information
environment, unfavorable other information news tends to increase future volatility
(coefficient = -0.084), but the regression coefficient for V+ is insignificant (coefficient
= -0.003; t = -0.17). This is consistent with Kothari et al. (2009), who find that
unfavorable disclosures are accompanied by a significant contemporaneous increase in
the firm’s risk. For firms classified as having a poor information environment, both
favorable and unfavorable other information is found to increase future volatility. The
coefficient associated with V+H in column (1) is positive (0.034) and significant (t =
2.79), while the comparable coefficient for V-H is -0.023 (t = -2.18). This suggests that,
when confronted with a poor information environment, analysts tend to focus less on
accounting fundamentals and rely more on other information. This also supports the
argument in Bryan and Tiras (2007) that Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model better
describes market pricing in poor information environments than in good information
environments.

44

Our results are robust to an alternative ranking based on the entire sample distribution rather than
year by year.
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[Insert Table 8 here]

7 Conclusion
In this study, we propose other information in analysts’ forecasts as an additional proxy
for future cash flows and evaluate its validity in explaining stock return volatility. In the
spirit of Ohlson (1995, 2001), other information is considered as the information about
fundamentals beyond that reflected in current financial statements and is measured by
using earnings forecasts made by financial analysts. Our empirical tests based on
standardized regressions and variance decomposition indicates that future volatility
increases if current other information is more uncertain or unfavorable. While the
variance decomposition approach suggests that other information is marginally less
important than accounting earnings in explaining future volatility, this is due to the
lower persistence and lower variability of other information. Nevertheless, the
standardized regressions that we also estimate highlight the economic and statistical
significance of other information in influencing future return volatility. We also find
that the above pattern holds with respect to both systematic and idiosyncratic volatility
and the relationship between other information and future return volatility is stronger
for firms with poor information environments.
Our results support the view that other information reflected in analysts’ forecasts is an
incremental indicator of fundamentals and demonstrate the potential importance of
including this proxy in stock price and volatility studies. For managers concerned with
the firm-specific risk component of stock volatility, our results suggest that attention to
the richness of the information environment for the stock may be warranted. Managers
may not necessarily be able to manage market volatility, let alone idiosyncratic
volatility, but they can take an active role in ensuring the richness of their firm’s
information environment, thereby reducing the extent to which information about the
firm’s fundamentals is uncertain.
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Appendix A: Detailed Derivation of Hypotheses
Recall that the ROE-based information dynamic is that ROEs satisfy the following
autoregressive process:

ROEt  c  wROEt 1  vt 1  ut ,

(A1a)

Vart 1 (ut )  g (u , u ,..., u , ut 1 ) ,
2
t 1

2
t 2

2
t k

(A1b)

vt  vt 1   t ,

(A1c)

(A1d)
Vart 1 ( t )  f ( ,  ,...,  ,  t 1 ) ,
where vt is other information, namely information about future earnings not in current
2
t 1

2
t 2

2
t k

financial information; w and φ are fixed persistence parameters that are nonnegative
and less than one; c is the intercept; ut and εt are the mean zero disturbance terms.
First, calculating the conditional expectation of ROEt+j at time t:
E t (ROEt  j )  E t ( c  wROEt  j 1  vt  j 1  u t  j )
 c  wE t (ROEt  j 1 )  E t ( vt  j 1 )
 c  wE t ( c  wROEt  j 2  vt  j 2  u t  j 1 )   j1vt
 c(1  w  w 2  ...  w j-1 )  w j E t (ROEt )  ( j1  w j2  ...  w j1 )vt
j

 c(1 - w j ) (1 - w)  w j ROEt   w i1 j-i vt
i 1

(A2)
Similarly, we have:
j

E t-1 (ROE t  j )  c(1 - w j1 ) (1  w)  w j1 ROE t-1   wi j-i v t-1 .

(A3)

i 0

Given (A2) and (A3), the change of expectation of ROEt+j can be written as:
j

Et (ROEt  j )  Et (ROEt  j )  Et -1 (ROEt  j )  w (vt -1  ut )   w j i r i -1 ( vt  vt -1 )  w j vt -1 .
j

i 1

After some algebra, we obtain:
E t (ROE t  j )  w ju t 

w j  j
t .
w 

(A4)

Summing up the discounted change in the change of expectation of ROEt+j, we have:


Et   j ROEt  j 
j 0

1

ut 
t .
1  w
(1  w)(1   )

(A5)

Therefore, we have the representation of equation (6):


Var t 1 ( E t   ROE t  j ) 
j

j0

1
(1  w) 2

Var t-1 (ut ) 

2
(1  w) 2 (1   ) 2

Var t-1 ( t ) .
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Appendix B: Variable Measurement

Variable

Measurement (#Compustat item numbers)

Panel A: Stock Return Volatility*
Total Volatility (TVOL)
Idiosyncratic volatility from
Fama-French model (IVOLF)
Systematic volatility from
Fama-French model (SVOLF)

The sample variance of daily stock returns (in percentage) over the
year
The sum of squared residuals from the Fama-French three-factor
model divided by the number of trading days within the year
Total volatility minus idiosyncratic volatility from Fama-French
model
* All volatility measures are in percentage and calculated from the fifth
month after the fiscal year-end, with the assumption that financial statement
numbers is publicly available within four months after the fiscal year-end.

Panel B: Firm-specific control variables
ROE
ROE volatility (VROE)
Firm stock return (RETURN)
AGE

SIZE

Leverage (LEV)
Book-to-market ratio (BM)
Forecast bias (BIAS)

Forecast dispersion (DISP)

Net income (NI) / lagged book value of equity (CEQ)
The sample variance of yearly ROEs observations over the past five
years for a minimum of three observations
Annual buy-and-hold returns, calculated from the sixth month after
the fiscal year-end
The logarithm of the number of months from the firm’s IPO date. If
IPO dates are unavailable, we use the first tracking date of the firm
appearing in the CRSP
The logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity at the end of fiscal
year, market value of equity is defined as common shares outstanding
(CSHO) times price - fiscal year - close (PRCC_F)
(Total long-term debt (DLTT) + debt in current liabilities (DLC)) /
Total assets (AT)
Book value of equity (CEQ) / market value of equity
The absolute difference between the one-year-ahead consensus
analyst forecast of year t+1 earnings per share reported in the fifth
month after the fiscal year-end, and the actual earnings per share
reported in I/B/E/S, divided by stock price at the fiscal year-end
The standard deviation of one-year-ahead consensus analyst forecasts
of year t+1 earnings per share, measured in the fifth month after the
fiscal year-end, standardized by the absolute value of consensus
analyst forecasts of year t+1 earnings per share

Panel C: Variables used in calculating other information
Book value of equity per share
(BVPS)
I/B/E/S ROE (AROE)
Forecast ROE (FROE)

ROE persistence (w)

Book value of equity (CEQ) / the multiplier of common shares
outstanding (CSHO) and adjusted factor (cumulative) by ex-date
(AJEX)
The actual earnings per share reported in I/B/E/S over BVPS
The one-year-ahead consensus analyst forecast of year t+1 earnings
per share reported in the fifth month after the fiscal year-end divided
by lagged book value of equity per share. The consensus analysts’
forecast is taken from the Summary History data set of I/B/E/S. This
variable is calculated on the basis of all outstanding forecasts as of
(ordinary) the third Thursday of each month. The results are
qualitatively similar if using the consensus analysts forecast in the
fifth month after the fiscal year-end.
The persistence of ROE as a function of known determinants,
including market share, firm size, R&D intensity, advertising
intensity, capital intensity, the magnitude of ROE, the magnitude of
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other information
variable ONE (V1)

other information
variable TWO (V2)

Volatility of other information
variable ONE (VV1)
Volatility of other information
variable TWO (VV2)

special items, and the magnitude of total accruals
The residual from regressing one-year-ahead analyst forecast of
future earnings (FROE) on current publicly available financial
information including book value of equity per share (BVPS) and
ROE (Bryan and Tiras 2007)
One-year-ahead analyst forecast of future earnings (FROE) minus the
expectation of earnings based only on current period earnings
estimated from the AR(1) process of ROE (Dechow et al. 1999 and
Ohlson 2001)
The sample variance of yearly V1 observations over the past five
years for a minimum of three observations
The sample variance of yearly V2 observations over the past five
years for a minimum of three observations

Panel D: Determinants of ROE persistence
Market share (Marketshare)
Firm size (TA)
R&D intensity (RD)
Advertising intensity (AD)
Capital intensity (CapIn)
Magnitude of ROE (ABSROE)
Magnitude of special items
(ABSSPI)
Magnitude of total accruals
(ABSTACC)

Sales (sale) / total sales over the industry
The natural logarithm of total assets (AT)
R&D expenditures (XRD) / sales
Advertising expenditures (XAD) / sales
Depreciation, depletion, and amortization expenses (DP) / sales
| ROE |
| Special items (SPI) | / lagged book value of equity
| Income before extraordinary items (IBC) - operating cash flow
(OANCF) | / lagged book value of equity

Note: if operating cash flow (OANCF) is missing or unavailable (prior to 1987), total accruals are estimated
as: change in current assets (ACT) - change in current liabilities (LCT) - change in cash and cash equivalents
(CHE) + change in debt in current liabilities (DLC) - depreciation, depletion, and amortization expenses
(DP). Debt in current liabilities is set to be zero if it is reported as missing in the Compustat.
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Table 1: Estimation of Other Information Variables
Panel A: The approach in Panel A follows Bryan and Tiras (2007), which parallels those in Ohlson and
Shroff (1992) and Manry et al. (2003) to estimate other information contained in analysts’ forecasts that
is not contained in earnings or net book value. We run the following cross-sectional regression:

FROEi ,t  c0  c1 BVPS i ,t  c2 ROEi ,t  vi ,t ,
where, for each firm i, FROEi,t is the one-year-ahead consensus analyst forecast of earnings per share at
year t divided by book value of equity per share at year t; BVPSi,t is net book value of equity per share at
year t; and vt is residual which proxies for other information. A separate regression is estimated for each
fiscal year, with each regression using all available observations for that year. Only the results for the
pooled sample are reported. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the
1% (5%, 10%) level for two-tailed test.
FROE
0.114***
(28.04)
0.409***
(32.46)

Intercept
ROE
AROE
BVPS

-0.001***
(-7.29)
34.8%

Adj. R2

FROE
0.079***
(15.72)

0.605***
(30.71)
-0.001***
(-6.68)
45.0%

Panel B: The approach in Panel B follows Dechow et al. (1999) and Fama and French (2002) to estimate
the persistence of ROE as a function of known economic determinants, including market share (the ratio
of firm’s sales to total industry sales), firm size (the natural logarithm of total assets), R&D intensity
(R&D expenditures over sales), advertising intensity (advertising expenditure over sales), capital
intensity (the ratio of depreciation, depletion and amortization to sales), the magnitude of earnings (the
absolute value of ROE), the magnitude of special items (the absolute value of the ratio of special items to
lagged book value), and the magnitude of total accruals (the absolute value of the ratio of total accruals to
lagged total assets). The process of ROE is as follows:
n

ROEi ,t 1  c  b0 ROEi ,t   bi ( Fi ,t ROEi ,t )  ui ,t 1 ,
i 1

where Fi,t is the i'th determinant of ROE persistence; i=1, 2, …,n, n is the number of variables used in the
cross-sectional estimation. A separate regression of equation is estimated for each fiscal year, with each
regression using all available observations for that year. Following Dechow et al. (1999), only the results
for the pooled sample are tabulated. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *** (**, *) indicates
significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for two-tailed test.

C
ROEt-1
ROEt-1 *Market share
ROEt-1 *Total Asset
ROEt-1 *R & D intensity
ROEt-1 *Advertising intensity
ROEt-1 *Capital intensity
ROEt-1 *Magnitude of ROE
ROEt-1 *Magnitude of special items
ROEt-1 *Magnitude of total accruals
Adj. R2

Coefficient
0.027***
0.591***
0.243***
0.005***
0.103***
0.718***
0.102**
-0.114***
-0.324***
-0.024*
28.9%

t-vale
(27.30)
(39.47)
(7.65)
(2.85)
(3.16)
(12.28)
(2.31)
(-15.42)
(-10.90)
(-1.81)
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for volatility, other information variables, and other control
variables. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix B.

Total volatility (TVOL)
Idiosyncratic volatility from FF model (IVOLF)
Systematic volatility from FF model (SVOLF)
V1
V2
VV1
VV2
ROE
VROE
AROE
FROE
Return
Log(Size)
Age (months)
Lev
BM
BIAS
DISP

Mean
12.332
10.090
2.242
0.000
0.058
0.009
0.010
0.113
0.072
0.131
0.158
0.131
6.631
210.010
0.220
0.620
0.026
0.169

Median
6.140
4.561
0.907
-0.010
0.036
0.002
0.003
0.129
0.007
0.133
0.149
0.079
6.535
146.000
0.196
0.513
0.004
0.056

Std. Dev.
21.326
19.523
4.309
0.123
0.118
0.016
0.017
0.274
0.243
0.217
0.200
0.515
1.678
200.985
0.184
0.479
0.137
0.405

Skew
5.995
6.620
7.024
0.827
1.465
3.038
2.875
2.105
5.619
0.710
1.361
1.533
0.252
1.620
0.775
2.672
7.259
5.473

Kurt
53.211
62.938
103.784
8.640
8.668
13.136
11.914
25.168
37.466
12.514
13.513
8.390
2.695
5.411
3.250
14.529
66.557
36.658
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Table 3: Standardized Regressions of Total Stock Return Volatility on Other
Information Variables and Other Variables
This table displays results from regressing stock return volatility on other information variables and other
variables at the firm level.

Log(VOLi ,t )   0   1Vi ,t 1   2Vi ,t 1   3 Log(VVi ,t 1 )   4 ROE i ,t 1   5 Log(VROE i ,t 1 )   6 Ri ,t
  7 Sizei ,t 1   8 Age i ,t 1   9 Lev i ,t 1   10 Log(BM i ,t 1 )   11 BIAS i ,t 1   12 DISPi ,t 1   i ,t
VOL is a proxy for total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, or systematic volatility respectively. Other
information variable V is calculated by paralleling the approaches in either Bryan and Tiras (2007) or
Dechow et al. (1999) (denoted as V1 and V2 respectively). V+ equals to V if V is positive and 0 otherwise.
V- equals to V if V is negative and 0 otherwise. The volatility of other information, VV, is the sample
variance of V within the past five years for a minimum of three observations. Control variables include
ROE (return on equity), VROE (the sample variance of ROE), RETURN (the contemporaneous annual
buy-and-hold returns), SIZE (the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity), AGE (the
logarithm of the number of months from the firm’s IPO date to the current year), LEV (financial
leverage), BM (the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity), BIAS (analyst forecast
bias), and DISP (analyst forecast dispersion). For Fama-MacBeth regression, the coefficients are
time-series averages of cross-sectional estimates. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. All t-statistics in
Panel A are calculated using standard errors corrected for both clustering by firm and clustering by year.
*** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for two-tailed test. The null hypothesis for the
Wald test is β1=-β2, and figures in parentheses are the probabilities of accepting the null hypothesis.
Panel A: Two-way clustering
V1
V2
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Intercept
-0.088
0.063
-0.088
0.068
(-0.82)
(0.68)
(-0.81)
(0.73)
V+
0.006
0.019
0.032**
0.012
(0.48)
(1.24)
(2.21)
(0.75)
V-0.204*** -0.105*** -0.139*** -0.090***
(-15.42) (-7.97)
(-9.09)
(-7.11)
LogVV
0.213*** 0.122***
0.171*** 0.092***
(9.69)
(6.96)
(8.23)
(5.10)
ROE
-0.127***
-0.128***
(-7.22)
(-7.20)
Log(VROE)
0.144***
0.154***
(10.17)
(10.30)
Return
-0.194**
-0.194**
(-2.21)
(-2.20)
Size
-0.215***
-0.223***
(-5.29)
(-5.56)
Age
-0.220***
-0.223***
(-7.18)
(-7.20)
Lev
-0.052***
-0.054***
(-4.34)
(-4.57)
BM
-0.048
-0.047
(-1.28)
(-1.28)
BIAS
0.124***
0.129***
(6.61)
(6.76)
DISP
0.047***
0.053***
(5.06)
(5.78)
N
Adj. R2
Wald test
p-value

42,699
10.0%
278.57
(.000)

40,837
35.5%
115.60
(.000)

42,699
8.1%
135.90
(.000)

40,837
34.8%
65.37
(.000)

Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression
V1
V2
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-0.113
-0.025
-0.110
-0.020
(-0.86)
(-0.22)
(-0.82)
(-0.17)
-0.006
0.001
0.030***
0.003
(-0.56)
(0.15)
(3.61)
(0.26)
-0.180*** -0.086*** -0.127*** -0.079***
(-15.29)
(-9.44)
(-8.46)
(-9.09)
0.207*** 0.107***
0.169*** 0.088***
(12.48)
(10.74)
(9.13)
(6.24)
-0.121***
-0.120***
(-6.81)
(-6.27)
0.147***
0.154***
(12.33)
(14.87)
-0.117***
-0.118***
(-3.94)
(-3.94)
-0.271***
-0.275***
(-9.29)
(-9.43)
-0.172***
-0.173***
(-5.16)
(-5.19)
-0.062***
-0.065***
(-4.56)
(-4.71)
-0.058*
-0.055*
(-2.07)
(-1.97)
0.095***
0.098***
(3.46)
(3.54)
0.059***
0.064***
(7.79)
(8.27)
42,699
12.2%
156.73
(.000)

40,837
51.4%
60.48
(.000)

42,699
8.9%
93.84
(.000)

40,837
50.9%
37.07
(.000)
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Table 4: Standardized Regression of Idiosyncratic and Systematic Stock Return
Volatility on Other Information Variables and Other Variables
This table displays results from regressing stock return volatility on other information variables and other
variables at the firm level.

Log(VOLi ,t )   0   1Vi ,t 1   2Vi ,t 1   3 Log(VVi ,t 1 )   4 ROE i ,t 1   5 Log(VROE i ,t 1 )   6 Ri ,t
  7 Sizei ,t 1   8 Age i ,t 1   9 Lev i ,t 1   10 Log(BM i ,t 1 )   11 BIAS i ,t 1   12 DISPi ,t 1   i ,t
VOL is a proxy for total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, or systematic volatility respectively. Other
information variable V is calculated by paralleling the approaches in either Bryan and Tiras (2007) or
Dechow et al. (1999) (denoted as V1 and V2 respectively). V+ equals to V if V is positive and 0 otherwise.
V- equals to V if V is negative and 0 otherwise. The volatility of other information, VV, is the sample
variance of V within the past five years for a minimum of three observations. Control variables include
ROE (return on equity), VROE (the sample variance of ROE), RETURN (the contemporaneous annual
buy-and-hold returns), SIZE (the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity), AGE (the
logarithm of the number of months from the firm’s IPO date to the current year), LEV (financial
leverage), BM (the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity), BIAS (analyst forecast
bias), and DISP (analyst forecast dispersion). All t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using
standard errors corrected for both clustering by firm and clustering by year. *** (**, *) indicates
significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for two-tailed test. The null hypothesis for the Wald test is β1=-β2,
and figures in parentheses are the probabilities of accepting the null hypothesis.
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Volatility
V1
V2
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Intercept
-0.135
0.048
-0.136
0.053
(-1.44)
(0.57)
(-1.43)
(0.63)
V+
0.009
0.012
0.044***
0.010
(0.96)
(0.97)
(3.83)
(0.75)
V-0.207*** -0.096*** -0.137*** -0.087***
(-18.16) (-9.40)
(-11.06)
(-7.93)
LogVV
0.209*** 0.127***
0.163*** 0.098***
(12.34)
(8.96)
(10.12)
(6.86)
ROE
-0.118***
-0.118***
(-7.80)
(-7.64)
Log(VROE)
0.132***
0.140***
(11.02)
(11.26)
Return
-0.163**
-0.163**
(-2.45)
(-2.44)
Size
-0.334***
-0.341***
(-10.64)
(-10.95)
Age
-0.217***
-0.220***
(-10.04)
(-10.09)
Lev
-0.030***
-0.033***
(-2.85)
(-3.12)
BM
-0.090**
-0.088**
(-2.57)
(-2.55)
BIAS
0.133***
0.137***
(9.35)
(9.51)
DISP
0.031***
0.036***
(3.31)
(3.84)
N
Adj. R2
Wald test
p-value

42,700
10.1%
323.58
(.000)

40,838
42.3%
135.80
(.000)

42,700
8.0%
75.90
(.000)

40,838
41.7%
35.64
(.000)

Panel B: Systematic Volatility
V1
V2
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
0.095
0.086
0.096
0.091
(0.64)
(0.67)
(0.64)
(0.71)
0.007
0.018
0.008
0.013
(0.37)
(1.11)
(0.37)
(0.69)
-0.113*** -0.114*** -0.094*** -0.097***
(-6.04)
(-5.59)
(-4.73)
(-5.51)
0.189*** 0.098***
0.173*** 0.075***
(5.83)
(3.77)
(5.61)
(2.92)
-0.123***
-0.125***
(-5.79)
(-5.85)
0.123***
0.129***
(4.42)
(4.58)
-0.128
-0.128
(-1.16)
(-1.16)
0.249***
0.240***
(4.38)
(4.30)
-0.170***
-0.173***
(-4.34)
(-4.37)
-0.089***
-0.091***
(-4.86)
(-5.02)
0.032
0.038
(0.78)
(0.95)
0.044
0.047
(1.40)
(1.48)
0.065***
0.071***
(3.29)
(3.65)
42,700
5.2%
16.26
(.000)

40,838
13.9%
20.34
(.000)

42,700
4.6%
15.45
(.000)

40,838
13.4%
17.02
(.000)
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Table 5: Standardized Regression of Stock Return Volatility on Other Information Variables and Other Variables, Controlling for
Analyst Forecast Bias, High Technology Firms and Loss Firms
This table displays results from regressing stock return volatility on other information variables and other variables at the firm level.

Log(VOLi ,t )  0  1Vi ,t 1  2Vi ,t 1  3 Log(VVi ,t 1 )  4 ROEi ,t 1  5 Log(VROEi ,t 1 )  6 Ri ,t  7 Sizei ,t 1  8 Agei ,t 1  9 Levi ,t 1  10Log(BM i ,t 1 )  11BIAS i ,t 1  12DISPi ,t 1   i ,t
VOL is a proxy for total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, or systematic volatility respectively. Other information variable V is calculated by paralleling the approaches in either Bryan and Tiras
(2007) or Dechow et al. (1999) (denoted as V1 and V2 respectively). V+ equals to V if V is positive and 0 otherwise. V- equals to V if V is negative and 0 otherwise. The volatility of other
information, VV, is the sample variance of V within the past five years for a minimum of three observations. Control variables include ROE (return on equity), VROE (the sample variance of ROE),
RETURN (the contemporaneous annual buy-and-hold returns), SIZE (the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity), AGE (the logarithm of the number of months from the firm’s IPO
date to the current year), LEV (financial leverage), BM (the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity), BIAS (analyst forecast bias), and DISP (analyst forecast dispersion). All
t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors corrected for both clustering by firm and clustering by year. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for two-tailed
test. The null hypothesis for the Wald test is β1=-β2, and figures in parentheses are the probabilities of accepting the null hypothesis.
Variables

Panel A: High
forecast bias

V1
V2
(1)
(2)
V+
0.019
-0.010
(0.80)
(-0.47)
V-0.112*** -0.084***
(-7.46)
(-5.85)
LogVV
0.131*** 0.107***
(6.35)
(5.06)
ROE
-0.129*** -0.132***
(-5.83)
(-5.74)
Log(VROE) 0.137*** 0.147***
(8.85)
(9.02)
Controls
Yes
Yes
N
19,563
19,563
Adj. R2
35.4%
34.5%
Wald test
165.62
142.24
p-value
(.000)
(.000)

Panel B: Low
forecast bias

Panel C: Highest
earnings forecast

Panel D: Lowest
earnings forecast

Panel E: High
technology firms

V1
V2
(3)
(4)
0.007
0.020
(0.56)
(1.28)
-0.087*** -0.076***
(-4.78)
(-4.88)
0.106*** 0.093***
(6.08)
(4.25)
-0.126*** -0.128***
(-7.60)
(-7.58)
0.120*** 0.130***
(7.83)
(8.48)
Yes
Yes
21,273
21,273
33.3%
33.0%
102.35
108.56
(.000)
(.000)

V1
V2
(5)
(6)
0.024
0.020
(1.42)
(1.02)
-0.084*** -0.075***
(-6.66)
(-6.38)
0.126*** 0.091***
(6.90)
(4.97)
-0.127*** -0.126***
(-7.28)
(-6.94)
0.151*** 0.156***
(10.14)
(9.93)
Yes
Yes
40,888
40,888
35.2%
34.6%
98.45
89.76
(.000)
(.000)

V1
V2
(7)
(8)
0.012
0.011
(0.95)
(0.85)
-0.117*** -0.105***
(-8.10)
(-7.56)
0.120*** 0.094***
(6.96)
(5.35)
-0.125*** -0.127***
(-6.99)
(-7.22)
0.138*** 0.148***
(9.83)
(10.12)
Yes
Yes
40,762
40,762
35.6%
35.0%
104.53
112.34
(.000)
(.000)

V1
V2
(9)
(10)
-0.012
-0.009
(-0.51)
(-0.38)
-0.060*** -0.058***
(-7.37)
(-4.23)
0.127*** 0.111***
(5.03)
(4.86)
-0.075*** -0.080***
(-2.76)
(-2.76)
0.107*** 0.110***
(4.42)
(4.40)
Yes
Yes
8,214
8,214
38.4%
37.8%
98.64
86.49
(.000)
(.000)

Panel F:
Non-technology
firms
V1
V2
(11)
(12)
0.034**
0.025
(2.22)
(1.46)
-0.115*** -0.100***
(-5.22)
(-4.79)
0.120*** 0.095***
(6.92)
(4.56)
-0.122*** -0.116***
(-7.01)
(-6.87)
0.131*** 0.141***
(8.03)
(7.91)
Yes
Yes
32,623
32,623
33.3%
32.6%
112.36
109.46
(.000)
(.000)

Panel G: Loss firms
V1
V2
(13)
(14)
-0.073*** -0.112***
(-2.94)
(-4.15)
-0.061*** -0.052***
(-5.84)
(-2.80)
0.123*** 0.109***
(4.64)
(3.79)
-0.136*** -0.178***
(-4.13)
(-4.80)
0.103*** 0.113***
(4.39)
(4.46)
Yes
Yes
6,530
6,530
32.1%
31.6%
36.76
85.46
(.000)
(.000)

Panel H: Profit firms
V1
V2
(15)
(16)
0.043*** 0.042**
(3.00)
(2.43)
-0.142*** -0.113***
(-5.99)
(-5.83)
0.111*** 0.078***
(6.32)
(4.42)
-0.135*** -0.123***
(-5.16)
(-5.29)
0.129*** 0.139***
(8.72)
(9.52)
Yes
Yes
34,307
34,307
29.6%
28.9%
104.34
96.58
(.000)
(.000)
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Table 6: Variance Decomposition of Mean-adjusted Returns on Other
Information Variables
Panel A and Panel B display the coefficient estimates for the log-linear vector autoregressive (VAR)
model for V1 and V2 respectively. The model variables include the mean-adjusted log excess returns
(return), the mean-adjusted log other information variables (v), and the mean-adjusted log
book-to-market ratio (bm). The standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** (**, *) indicates
significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for two-tailed test.
Panel A: Estimated parameters from the VAR model for V1
Variables
returnt
vt
bmt

returnt-1
-0.032*
(0.120)
0.004
(0.032)
-0.071***
(0.050)

vt-1
0.342***
(0.367)
0.251***
(0.162)
-0.103***
(0.115)

bmt-1
0.285***
(0.194)
-0.071***
(0.056)
0.710***
(0.091)

Panel B: Estimated parameters from the VAR model for V2
Variables
returnt
vt
bmt

returnt-1
-0.029*
(0.119)
-0.008*
(0.031)
-0.071***
(0.049)

v1t-1
0.311***
(0.363)
0.167***
(0.136)
-0.111***
(0.107)

bmt-1
0.256***
(0.192)
-0.038***
(0.054)
0.717***
(0.092)

Panel C shows the variance decomposition for the VAR model. var(Nr,t) is the variance of
expected-return news. var(Nv,t) is the variance of other information news. cov(Nr,t, Nv,t) is the covariance
between expected-return news and other information news. VR is total variance of mean-adjusted excess
return, equal to var(Nr,t) + var(Nv,t) - 2cov(Nr,t, Nv,t). var(Nv)+ is the variance of other information news
when other information news is positive. var(Nv)- is the variance of other information news when other
information news is negative. DIFF is the difference between the variance of positive other information
news and the variance of negative other information news, var(Nv)+ - var(Nv)-. The standard errors (in
parentheses) of the variances are computed using the Shao-Rao (1993) jackknife method. *** (**, *)
indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for two-tailed test.
Variables
V1
V2

var(Nr)
0.017***
(0.011)
0.016***
(0.011)

var(Nv)
0.135***
(0.062)
0.132***
(0.061)

cov(Nr, Nv)
-0.017***
(0.014)
-0.019***
(0.014)

VR
0.185***
(0.097)
0.186***
(0.097)

var(Nv)+
0.065***
(0.038)
0.064***
(0.038)

var(Nv)0.070***
(0.066)
0.068***
(0.063)

DIFF
-0.005*
(0.067)
-0.004*
(0.065)

Panel D displays the relative size of each variance/covariance component to the total variance.
Variables
V1
V2

VR
0.185
0.186

V(Nr)/VR
0.090
0.085

V(Nv)/VR
0.731
0.711

cov(Nr, Nv)/VR
-0.089
-0.102
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Panel E shows the variance decomposition for the VAR model and the relative size of each
variance/covariance component to the total variance. var(Nr,t) is the variance of expected-return news.
var(NROE,t) is the variance of mean-adjusted earnings (ROE) news. cov(Nr,t, NROE,t) is the covariance
between expected-return news and earnings news. VR is total variance of mean-adjusted excess return,
equal to var(Nr,t) + var(NROE,t) - 2cov(Nr,t, NROE,t). The standard errors (in parentheses) of the variances are
computed using the Shao-Rao (1993) jackknife method. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%,
10%) level for two-tailed test.
Variables
ROE

var(Nr)
0.020***
(0.137)

var(Nv)
0.205***
(0.551)

cov(Nr, Nv)
0.006***
(0.194)

VR
0.214***
(0.482)

V(Nr)/VR
0.095

V(Nv)/VR
0.958

cov(Nr, Nv)/VR
0.027
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Table 7: Variance Decomposition of Mean-Adjusted Returns on Other
Information Variables and Accounting Earnings
Panel A and Panel B display the coefficient estimates for the log-linear vector autoregressive (VAR)
model for V1 and V2 respectively. The model variables include the mean-adjusted log excess returns
(return), the mean-adjusted log other information variables (v), the mean-adjusted log accounting
earnings (roe), and the mean-adjusted log book-to-market ratio (bm). The standard errors are presented in
parentheses. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for two-tailed test.
Panel A: Estimated parameters from the VAR model for V1
Variables
returnt
vt
roe t
bmt

returnt-1
-0.042**
(0.114)
0.000
(0.031)
0.082***
(0.061)
-0.072***
(0.050)

vt-1
0.399***
(0.346)
0.269***
(0.148)
0.615***
(0.217)
-0.090***
(0.124)

roe t-1
0.159***
(0.205)
0.084***
(0.057)
0.389***
(0.113)
0.017*
(0.061)

bmt-1
0.347***
(0.183)
-0.039***
(0.058)
-0.109***
(0.107)
0.715***
(0.087)

roe t-1
0.182***
(0.240)
0.038***
(0.058)
0.422***
(0.137)
0.012
(0.077)

bmt-1
0.325***
(0.177)
-0.022***
(0.056)
-0.139***
(0.120)
0.720***
(0.088)

Panel B: Estimated parameters from the VAR model for V2
Variables
returnt
vt
roe t
bmt

returnt-1
-0.042**
(0.112)
-0.010***
(0.030)
0.085**
(0.063)
-0.072***
(0.049)

vt-1
0.407***
(0.381)
0.179***
(0.155)
0.600***
(0.241)
-0.091***
(0.143)

Panel C shows the variance decomposition for the VAR model. var(Nr,t) is the variance of
expected-return news. var(Nv,t) is the variance of other information news. var(Nroe,t) is the variance of
expected-return news. cov(Nr,t, Nv,t) and cov(Nr,t, Nroe,t) are the covariance of expected-return news with
other information news and earnings news respectively. cov(Nv,t, Nroe,t) is the covariance between other
information news and earnings news. DIFF1 is the difference between the variance of other information
news and the variance of earnings news, var(Nv,t) - var(Nroe,t). VR is total variance of mean-adjusted
excess return, equal to var(Nr,t) + var(Nv,t) + var(Nroe,t) - 2cov(Nr,t, Nv,t) - 2cov(Nr,t, Nroe,t) + 2cov(Nv,t,
Nroe,t). var(Nv)+ is the variance of other information news when other information news is positive.
var(Nv)- is the variance of other information news when other information news is negative. DIFF1 is the
difference between the variance of positive other information news and the variance of negative other
information news, var(Nv)+ - var(Nv)-. The standard errors (in parentheses) of the variances are computed
using the Shao-Rao (1993) jackknife method. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level
for two-tailed test.
var(Nr)
V1 0.018***
(0.013)
V2 0.017***
(0.012)

var(Nv) var(Nroe)
0.061***
(0.016)
0.050***
(0.006)

0.122***
(0.055)
0.127***
(0.063)

DIFF1
-0.061***
(0.043)
-0.077***
(0.058)

cov(Nr,
cov(Nr,
cov(Nv,
VR
var(Nv)+ var(Nv)N v)
Nroe)
Nroe)
0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.184*** 0.028*** 0.033***
(0.006)
(0.010)
(0.005)
(0.101) (0.007) (0.015)
0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.184*** 0.024*** 0.026***
(0.003)
(0.011)
(0.004)
(0.101) (0.003) (0.005)
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DIFF2
-0.005*
(0.017)
-0.002*
(0.006)

Panel D displays the relative size of each variance/covariance component to the total variance.

V1
V2

VR
0.184
0.184

V(Nr)/VR
0.098
0.092

V(Nv)/VR V(Nroe)/VR cov(Nr, Nv)/VR cov(Nr, Nroe)/VR
0.332
0.663
0.045
-0.036
0.272
0.690
0.027
-0.032

cov(Nv, Nroe)/VR
-0.038
-0.033

Panel E shows the variance decomposition for the VAR model for alternative other information variables,
including other information variables when using total assets as the denominator (Panel E1), when using
highest earnings forecasts rather the mean forecasts (Panel E2), and when using lowest earnings forecasts
rather the mean forecasts (Panel E3). The standard errors (in parentheses) of the variances are computed
using the Shao-Rao (1993) jackknife method. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level
for two-tailed test.
var(Nr) var(Nv) var(Nroe) DIFF1
cov(Nr, Nv)
cov(Nr, Nroe)
Panel E1: Total asset as the denominator
V1 0.019*** 0.064*** 0.123*** -0.059***
0.007***
-0.010***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.050) (0.037)
(0.006)
(0.009)
V2 0.019*** 0.049*** 0.130*** -0.081***
0.005***
-0.006***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.063) (0.058)
(0.003)
(0.011)
Panel E2: Other information variable based on highest earnings forecasts
V1 0.018*** 0.060*** 0.124*** -0.068***
0.005***
-0.006***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.056) (0.044)
(0.006)
(0.010)
V2 0.017*** 0.048*** 0.131*** -0.083***
0.004**
-0.006***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.066) (0.061)
(0.003)
(0.011)
Panel E3: Other information variable based on lowest earnings forecasts
V1 0.020*** 0.057*** 0.122*** -0.065***
0.009***
-0.008***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.054) (0.042)
(0.006)
(0.009)
V2 0.018*** 0.047*** 0.128*** -0.081***
0.004***
-0.005***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.061) (0.055)
(0.003)
(0.011)

cov(Nv, Nroe)

VR

-0.014***
(0.005)
-0.008***
(0.004)

0.184***
(0.101)
0.184***
(0.101)

-0.010***
(0.005)
-0.008***
(0.004)

0.184***
(0.101)
0.184***
(0.101)

-0.007***
(0.006)
-0.006***
(0.004)

0.183***
(0.101)
0.183***
(0.101)
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Table 8: Standardized Regression of Stock Return Volatility on Other
Information Variables, Controlling for Information Environment
This table presents results from regressing stock return volatility on other information variables and other
variables at the firm level.

Log(VOLi ,t )   0   1Vi ,t 1   2Vi ,t 1  H i ,t 1   3Vi ,t 1   4Vi ,t 1  H i ,t 1   5 Log(VVi ,t 1 )
  6 ROEi ,t 1  7 Log(VROEi ,t 1 )   8 Ri ,t   9 Sizei ,t 1   10 Agei ,t 1   11Levi ,t 1
  12 Log(BM i ,t 1 )   13 BIAS i ,t 1   14 DISPi ,t 1   i ,t
VOL is a proxy for total volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, or systematic volatility respectively. other
information variable V is calculated by paralleling the approaches in either Bryan and Tiras (2007) or
Dechow et al. (1999) (denoted as V1 and V2 respectively). V+ equals to V if V is positive and 0 otherwise.
V- equals to V if V is negative and 0 otherwise. H is a dummy indicator variable representing firms with
poor information environments (proxied by earnings quality, forecast dispersion, or forecast bias) when
equal to 1. When the value of the information environment variable (earnings quality, forecast dispersion,
or forecast bias) for a firm-year is ranked in the upper or lower half of the distribution in the
corresponding year, we classify this observation as a “good” or “poor” information environment,
respectively. The volatility of other information, VV, is the sample variance of V within the past five
years for a minimum of three observations. Control variables include ROE (return on equity), VROE (the
sample variance of ROE), RETURN (the contemporaneous annual buy-and-hold returns), SIZE (the
natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity), AGE (the logarithm of the number of months
from the firm’s IPO date to the current year), LEV (financial leverage), BM (the ratio of the book value of
equity to the market value of equity), BIAS (analyst forecast bias), and DISP (analyst forecast dispersion).
All t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors corrected for both clustering by firm
and clustering by year. *** (**, *) indicates significant at the 1% (5%, 10%) level for two-tailed test. The
null hypothesis for the Wald test is β1=-β2, and figures in parentheses are the probabilities of accepting the
null hypothesis.
Panel A: Earnings quality
V1
V2
(1)
(2)
Intercept
0.108
0.113
(1.19)
(1.25)
V+
-0.003
-0.006
(-0.17)
(-0.31)
V+ * H
0.034***
0.044***
(2.79)
(3.58)
V-0.084*** -0.083***
(-5.13)
(-5.22)
V- * H
-0.023**
-0.023**
(-2.18)
(-2.01)
LogVV
0.139***
0.113***
(8.54)
(6.72)
ROE
-0.095*** -0.093***
(-5.15)
(-5.02)
Log(VROE) 0.118***
0.122***
(7.43)
(7.43)
Control
N
Adj. R2
Wald test
p-value

Yes
27,150
38.2%
67.18
(.000)

Yes
27,150
37.6%
80.74
(.000)

Forecast dispersion
V1
V2
(3)
(4)
0.063
0.068
(0.68)
(0.73)
0.004
-0.010
(0.31)
(-0.68)
0.024*** 0.039***
(2.86)
(4.78)
-0.065*** -0.082***
(-2.59)
(-3.41)
-0.049** -0.021**
(-2.45)
(-1.98)
0.121*** 0.092***
(6.87)
(5.11)
-0.119*** -0.120***
(-6.51)
(-6.62)
0.140*** 0.149***
(9.58)
(9.77)
Yes
40,837
35.6%
63.23
(.000)

Yes
40,837
34.9%
68.41
(.000)

Forecast bias
V1
V2
(5)
(6)
0.063
0.068
(0.68)
(0.73)
0.010
0.011
(1.23)
(1.15)
0.016*
0.017*
(1.71)
(1.69)
-0.075*** -0.080***
(-6.96)
(-5.97)
-0.047*** -0.015*
(-3.52)
(-1.94)
0.119*** 0.091***
(6.75)
(5.07)
-0.125*** -0.128***
(-6.88)
(-6.99)
0.146*** 0.154***
(10.25)
(10.34)
Yes
40,837
35.6%
76.19
(.000)

Yes
40,837
34.8%
77.56
(.000)
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